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Duck When a Conflict of Interest Blinds
You: Judicial Conflicts of Interest in the
Matters of Scalia and Ginsburg
By MARIANNE M. JENNINGS* AND NIM RAZOOK**
It's acceptable practice to socialize with executive branch officials when there
are not personal claims against them. That's all I'm going to say for now.
Quack, quack.
-Justice Antonin Scalia1
THE DUCK FEATHERS flew after Justice Antonin Scalia, a close
friend of Vice President Dick Cheney, flew to Louisiana with the Vice
President on a government plane. This sojourn occurred just after the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in a case in which the Vice
President was the named petitioner.2 Scalia's above quoted comment
responded to mounting pressure from the press as well as from the
opposing parties and amicus that he recuse himself from that case.3
While Scalia was roasted by the media, battles along political ideo-
logical lines emerged. Attention heightened when conservative
groups resorted to the time-tested saying of, "That's a pot calling the
kettle black" and pointed to various activities of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Thanks to the vigilance of the pot group, or perhaps the
kettle group, we soon learned that on January 29, 2004, Justice Gins-
burg addressed the National Organization for Women's ("NOW") Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund annual dinner.4 Just fifteen days
prior to her address Justice Ginsburg had taken the position advanced
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1. David Von Drehle & Gina Holland, Justice Scalia: No Apologies for Hunting Trip with
Cheney, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2004, at 35.
2. The case is Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
3. See Editorial, Beyond the Duck Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at A20 (labeling
Scalia's refusal to disqualify himself in this case "bad judgment"); Editorial, Scalia Should
Duck This One, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 2004, at 14A (arguing that Justice Scalia's
unwillingness to recuse himself in this case damages the Court).
4. Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Ginsburg Has Ties to Activist Group, LA.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Ties].
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by NOW in its amicus brief in Frew v. Hawkins.5 The case dealt with the
rights of children under Medicaid programs.6 Justice Ginsburg was
giving the fourth lecture in a series of NOW Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund that is called, "The Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Distin-
guished Lecture Series on Women and the Law." 7
The Scalia and Ginsburg controversies resulted in a passionate
debate, which involved legal scholars and kitchen table participants
and raised important questions about impartiality at the supreme level
of judicial review where there are no substitute judges, and there is
life tenure. The purpose of this Article is to describe the details of the
Scalia and Ginsburg issues and other types of conflicts that can and do
exist among the United States Supreme Court judges, provide the
backdrop for the legal and judicial ethical code standards for con-
flicts, and suggest standards within the context of non-code ethical
standards.
Conflicts of interest are best managed at the United States Su-
preme Court level through public disclosure. Nevertheless, such a vol-
untary policy and accompanying disclosure presumes that individuals
recognize their own conflicts of interest as well as appreciate their seri-
ous nature and the need for effective management as a means of
building and ensuring public trust. Judicial integrity requires rigorous
self-discipline and favoring cautions and declarations over evasion.
While such a voluntary, self-policing approach may be the best solu-
tion to conflicts at the United States Supreme Court level, it does re-
quire the Justices to recognize that slipping standards generally have
made our society somewhat insensitive to conflicts and their manage-
ment. In today's interconnected environments, many are either not
seeing conflicts of interest or deeming them so. trivial that disclosure is
unnecessary. Such sloppy self-determination undermines the reputa-
tion of individual Justices and the Court. Hindsight analysis of these
failures by individual Justices damages the Court's reputation and its
perceived independence. If unilateral management of conflicts is the
solution to judicial conflicts of interest at the highest levels of our judi-
ciary, then vigilance and wide-sweeping disclosure must increase along
with sensitivity to all activities by the Justices.
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I traces Justice
Scalia's now infamous duck hunting trip in light of his involvement in
5. 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
6. See id.
7. The lecture series is co-sponsored by the New York State Bar, and the Bar paid
Justice Ginsburg's expenses for travel to and from the dinner. Ties, supra note 4, at A20.
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the Cheney case. Part II examines Justice Ginsburg's involvement with
NOW and the potential conflicts her activities may pose. Part III ex-
plores generally the problems of conflicts of interest, while Part IV
identifies and discusses those conflicts typically associated with the ju-
diciary. Advocating goals of transparency and judicial balance, Part V
notes that the autonomy of the United States Supreme Court necessi-
tates the retention of the status quo-individual judicial discretion in
making conflict of interest decisions-but argues that decisions, such
as those of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg will almost certainly have a
negative effect on the Court.
I. The Factual Backdrop for Scalia and Cheney: No Ducking
Facts or Issues
A. The Bush Administration's National Energy Policy Development
Group
This recent raging and blinding debate over judicial conflicts be-
gan when President Bush formed, in his second week in office, his
National Energy Policy Group ("NEPD") or National Energy Policy
Development Group ("NEPDG"), 8 commonly referred to as the En-
ergy Task Force, a group created to discuss energy policy in the
United States and provide a program for managing United States en-
ergy resources. 9 Mr. Cheney was charged by the President to develop
all energy policy that dealt with issues such as oil supplies, oil prices,
alternative energy sources, barriers to energy capture and develop-
ments, and oil dependence. The topics of energy production and con-
servation will always have a polarizing effect, but the NEPD had more
than the usual battle lines drawn between energy producers and envi-
ronmental groups. 10 The NEPD held a series of meetings with energy
producer executives from around the country and across various en-
ergy industries from oil production to electric utilities.
8. The Court refers to the body as NEPDG, and Congress refers to the group as
NEPD, but the authors have determined that they are indeed one and the same group.
They are usually referred to in publications as the Energy Task Force (no acronym used).
9. The NEPD was appointed when Mr. Bush took office in January 2001 and issued
its report on May 16, 2001. NAT'L ENERGY Pouicv DEV. GROUP, RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE (2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (last visited June 25, 2005). Members
of the group, chaired by Vice President Cheney, included: Gale Norton, Colin Powell,
Norm Mineta, Paul O'Neill, Donald Evans, Ann Veneman, Spencer Abraham, Joe
Allbaugh, Christie Todd Whitman,Joshua Bolten, Mitchell Daniels, Lawrence Lindsay, and
Ruben Barrales. Id. at v.
10. See infra notes 15-20.
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By April 2001, the Democrats of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce had called for an investigation of the NEPD by the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO"). There were months of
legal wrangling between Mr. Cheney's office, the GAO, and the House
Democrats over the authority of the GAO to investigate."l The final
report's release in May only heightened the tensions and scrutiny, and
the GAO pursued its investigation by asking the NEPD to release the
dates of its meetings, the lists of participants at those meetings, their
locations, and the subject matters of those meetings.12 When the me-
dia began carrying reports about the task force and its recommenda-
tion, the GAO found that the documents released pursuant to its
request fell short.13 Representatives Henry Waxman and John Dingell,
the chairs of the House Democrats for the Energy and Commerce
Committee, sent a letter to the Vice President demanding disclosure
and explanations for what they called conflicts of interest.1 4
B. The Litigation over the Policy Group
The attention of the House, the media, and government adminis-
tration also brought the attention of special interest groups. The pub-
lic watchdog group, Judicial Watch, a nonprofit with a history of
seeking full disclosure on all government processes, sought to obtain
the same information that the GAO had requested. 15 The other group
11. See House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Democrats, Investigation of the Energy
Task Force: Chronology of Correspondence.
12. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to Rep. J.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.house.gov/commerce democrats/EnergyTaskForce/gaorpt-81701.pdf.
13. The first report that caught the House Democrats' attention was a Los Angeles
Times article. Judy Pasternak, Bush's Energy Plan Bares Industry Clout, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
2001, at Al. The article indicated the final recommendations in the report favored Halli-
burton, a company for whom Mr. Cheney served as CEO prior to returning to public life
via his run for the Vice Presidency and thatJoe Allbaugh's wife, a lobbyist, was employed by
many of the companies favored in the policy recommendations. Another aspect of the
news article was that Peabody Coal was given unusual access to the NEPDG, and it had
contributed $900,000 to the Bush campaign. Id.
14. Letter from Reps. Henry Waxman &John Dingell to Vice President Cheney (Aug.
29, 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/EnergyTaskForce/
cheneyaug29.pdf (last visited June 25, 2005).
15. Judicial Watch was the key party in the litigation seeking disclosure of the mem-
bers and deliberations of the Health Care Task Force chaired by Hillary Rodham Clinton
during the Clinton Administration. The court ruled that the Health Care Task Force was
not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"). Ass'n of Am. Physicians &
Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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at the forefront of the disclosure demands was the Sierra Club.1 6 The
GAO filed suit against Mr. Cheney seeking release of the information,
and the public battle found Mr. Cheney, along with members of Con-
gress,Judicial Watch, and the Sierra Club, interviewed on a number of
news shows. 17
The very public and contentious nature of these issues, as well as
the eventual litigation, are critical parts of the discussion of its even-
tual disposition at the United States Supreme Court, including Scalia's
involvement. Mr. Cheney's position with regard to preserving the
shroud of secrecy was based in presidential privilege, which is
grounded in the need for the executive branch to have candid discus-
sions with experts and members of industry. 18 His adamant position is
perhaps a critical factor in the Scalia recusal issues. 19 The position of
the others with an interest in the case and in the NEPD was that pub-
lic policy should not be established in secret.20
16. The Sierra Club has extensive involvement in elections, and its website reflects its
anti-Bush/Cheney sentiments. See Sierra Club, Politics and Elections, http://www.sier-
raclub.org/politics/ (last visited June 25, 2005).
17. Elizabeth Bumiller, Cheney Set to Do Battle to Keep His Enron Papers Secret, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2002, at Al; Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast Jan. 27, 2002).
18. Mr. Cheney noted on a Sunday news program,
GAO is a creature of the Congress .... Their jurisdiction extends to agencies
created by statute. That's not me .... [A]s part of the office of the President and
Vice President of the United States, I'm a constitutional officer. And the authority
of the GAO does not extend in that case to my office.
Fox News Sunday, supra note 17. Mr. Cheney also stated,
[w]hat's really at stake here is the ability of the President and the Vice President
to get.., good, solid, unvarnished advice without having to make it available to a
member of Congress.... What I object to, and what we've told the GAO we won't
do is make it impossible for me or future Vice Presidents to ever have a conversa-
tion in confidence with anybody .... You just cannot accept that proposition
without putting a chill over the ability of the President and Vice President to
receive unvarnished advice.
Id. See also Letter from Reps. Henry Waxman & John Dingell to Vice President Cheney
(Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/commerce.democrats/EnergyTask
Force/waxmanjddl 3002.pdf.
19. The New York Times reported, "Vice President Dick Cheney said today that the
White House was prepared to go to court to fight the release of documents demanded by
Congress as part of the investigation into any influence the Enron Corporation had in
formulating the Bush Administration's energy policy." Bumiller, supra note 17, at Al.
20. See Statement of Carl Pope, Executive Director, Sierra Club, President's Energy
Plan Makes the Wrong Choices, available at http://www.sierraclub.org/globalwarming/
bush-plan/pressrelease2.asp (last visitedJune 25, 2005) for the view of the Sierra Club and
the backdrop.
The Vice President's task force proposed a policy that would benefit big energy
companies while doing nothing to promote true energy independence.... Amer-
icans have a right to know who wrote this policy. Besides what we know about
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Judicial Watch beat the GAO to court and filed suit against Mr.
Cheney and the NEPD on July 26, 2001 in federal district court in
Washington, D.C. for violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
("FACA").21 FACA mandates public access to some records of advisory
committees: "Subject to [the requirements of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOIA")], the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, ap-
pendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents
which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory com-
mittee shall be available for public inspection and copying.... "2
Enron's influence, we don't know the most basic information about the energy
industry lobbyists who helped draft the task force recommendations.
Press Release, Nat'l Res. Def. Council, NRDC Asks Court to Force Immediate Release of Secret
Energy Task Force Details (Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressre-
leases/020130.asp. See also Nat'l Res. Def. Council, How NRDC Brought the Records to
Light, http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/bkgrd.asp#vaughn (last visitedJune 25,
2005) for a discussion of the records withheld, the perceptions of the court proceedings,
and the concerns about input on national energy policy.
Judicial Watch declared:
"Executive privilege was improperly invoked by Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, and
now the Bush [A]dministration .... We feel confident that the Supreme Court
will reject this abuse and that the American people will eventually learn the na-
ture of the Energy Task Force and the recommendations it made to President
Bush on the supposed behalf of the American people."
Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch Sues VP Cheney over Energy Task Force, http://www.judi-
cialwatch.org/cases/67/factsheet.htm (last visitedJune 25, 2005). The group continued to
state: "The Bush [A]dministration should stop invoking the Constitution to protect itself
from accountability and any resulting political fallout. The American people have a right
to know whether lobbyists became de facto members of the Energy Task Force who wrote
our nation's energy policies."Id.
21. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003);Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy
Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002). Also named as defendants in the suit
were the members of the NEPD and several "non-federal employees" who were alleged to
have participated in the meetings of NEPD, including Ken Lay (former CEO and Chair-
man of Enron), Mark Racicot, national chairman of Committee to Elect President Bush
and Governor of Montana, Haley Barbour, former chair of the Republican National Com-
mittee, and Thomas Kuhn, President of the Edison Electric Institute. The intensity of inter-
est in the NEPD and the litigation was only heightened by the revelation of Mr. Lay's name
as one of the private parties because at this time, Enron began its downward spiral into
bankruptcy, and Mr. Lay had been a substantial contributor to Mr. Bush's campaign for
President and his previous runs for Governor of Texas. See Steven Weiss, The Fall of a Giant:
Enron's Campaign Contributions and Lobbying, http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v6/alertv6
_31.asp; see also Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REv 163
(2003) (providing the full time line and background on Enron, the timeline of its collapse
and its political donations) [hereinafter Primer on Enron].
22. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10(b) (2000).
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The Sierra Club had filed suit in Northern California, and the
district court there transferred the case to the D.C. court,23 where the
cases were consolidated by the federal district court. Mr. Cheney and
three of the private parties to the suit then moved for dismissal of the
case. 24 The court dismissed the private parties in the case in an opin-
ion that reflected frustration with the defendants' attorneys in the
case. 25 In what was a rather complex opinion on the interaction of
FACA and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), the federal dis-
trict court ruled that while there was no private right of action under
FACA, the federal "mandamus statute may provide an avenue to rem-
edy violations of statutory duties even when the statute that creates the
duty does not contain a private cause of action."26 The court held that
23. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2002).
24. Id. at 24. The court does not identify which of the three parties moved for the
dismissal along with the Vice President.
25. There was judicial commentary on the lack of preparation:
At that hearing, government's counsel admitted to this Court that the briefs sub-
mitted did not represent the government's best efforts, and requested further
opportunity to research and brief the important issues raised by this case. Despite
the serious inadequacies in the government's briefing to date, the Court found
that it was in the interest of justice to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint
and the defendant to re-brief its motion to dismiss.
Id. at 26.
There was also commentary on legal skills and disingenuousness:
The Court discussed several serious deficiencies in the legal arguments raised by
the government, particularly the government's failure to cite controlling adverse
authority from the D.C. Circuit on the issue of mootness, despite government's
counsel having also been counsel in those cases. In addition, the Court discussed
what appeared to be government counsel's mischaracterization of Supreme Court
precedent on the constitutional separation of powers issue. Defense counsel con-
ceded that it had argued for the application of a constitutional standard that did
not reflect controlling law without informing the Court that it was doing so.
Id. at 25-26.
In a footnote, the court elaborated:
In this case, and in at least one other before this Court, Stillman v. Doe, Civ. Action
No. 01-1342(EGS) (D.D.C.), the government has proceeded by mischaracterizing
the existing standard and invoking the concurring opinion of three Justices of the
Supreme Court in Public Citizen as controlling authority. The fact that the gov-
ernment has stubbornly refused to acknowledge the existing controlling law in at
least two cases, does not strike this Court as a coincidence. One or two isolated
mis-citations or misleading interpretations of precedent are forgivable mistakes of
busy counsel, but a consistent pattern of misconstruing precedent presents a
much more serious concern.
Id. at 50 n. 14. Interestingly, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in one case reviewed by the
lower court (Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 697 (1988)) was important as was the fact that in
another case on a similar issue, he had recused himself (Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989)).
26. Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
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the statutory language of FACA made it unequivocally clear that a
mandamus action could lie under FACA:
The duty to make documents related to an advisory committee
available to the public is non-discretionary. Section 10(b) states:
Subject to [FOA], the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, ap-
pendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda or other docu-
ments which were made available to or prepared for or by each
advisory committee shall be available for public inspection and
copying at a single location in the offices of the advisory committee
or the agency to which the advisory committee reports until the
advisory committee ceases to exist. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(b). The
language of this section leaves no room for discretion: the records
"shall be available for public inspection."27
Nevertheless, while the mandamus action could lie, the court was
not prepared to decide the issue of whether mandamus would lie until
the parties had completed discovery in the case. Indeed, the court
noted that the constitutional issue of whether FACA applied to those
situations in which there were presidential deliberations was one that
not only required determination, but that the determination could
not be made until there was adequate discovery. The court ordered
the parties to develop a discovery plan, and Mr. Cheney petitioned the
court of appeals for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's
discovery orders, directing the district court to rule on the basis of the
administrative record and ordering his dismissal as a party.28
In a two to one decision, the appellate court dismissed the appeal
noting that the arguments made by the dissenting judge were not
made by the defendants, and the court was not inclined to raise them
sua sponte. 29 The dissenting judge noted that there was no private
cause of action under FACA (as the lower court had concluded), but
further stated that the APA did not apply and that there was no cause
of action against an advisory committee, particularly under a manda-
27. Id. at 43.
28. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
29. The majority noted:
Finally, most of the arguments raised in the dissenting opinion have never been
presented to the District Court and they were not raised for consideration in the
Government's brief to this court or in the oral argument before this court. In
other words, the dissent's position rests on a view of FACA that has never been
urged by the Government. "Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal
appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the
proper resolution is beyond any doubt, or where 'injustice might otherwise re-
sult.' Suffice it to say that this is not such a case."
Id. at 1112 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)).
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mus proceeding.3 0 Despite the contentiousness of the opinions, the
judges did agree on one thing: the lack of clarity in the decision on
the Clinton Health Care Task Force,3 1 or the AAPS case as it is called,
that places the litigants and the courts in the confused state of what is
and is not required of advisory groups. The dissent notes that even
discovery cannot remedy the legal questions that exist because of
FACA and AAPS:
My colleagues are confident that the district court can rein in the
discovery, but I cannot see how this can be done in any non-arbi-
trary way. The AAPS opinion provides no standards. And my col-
leagues never articulate their conception of de facto membership.
Left open is an extensive area to be explored in depositions, inter-
rogatories, and document production. Consider just a few of the
possibilities. Suppose it turns out that a private individual attended
6 of the Group's 12 meetings. Would that make him a defacto mem-
ber? Would it matter if discovery revealed that some of the mem-
bers the President appointed attended the same number of, or
even fewer, meetings? What if the private individual attended all
meetings but did not speak, or was present only for a short period
each time? Would it matter whether the private individual had a
place at the table or sat on the side with the Group's staff? Or
whether the private individual attended only a few meetings, but
was quite influential in the formulation of the final recommenda-
tions? Should there be discovery into what impact the person's
presence or statements had on the other members, and how would
that discovery proceed? Suppose the private individual submitted
memoranda or other documents. Is there to be discovery for the
purpose of determining whether the other members of the Group
took those documents into account in performing their informa-
tion gathering function or in formulating their view of energy pol-
icy? (One of the complaints alleges that a corporate CEO handed
30. The dissenting judge took the time to express his concerns about the criticality of
their ruling and the constitutionality of FACA:
As applied to committees the President establishes to give him advice, FACA has
for many years teetered on the edge of constitutionality. SeeJay S. Bybee, Advising
the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J.
51 (1994). The decision in this case pushes it over. The case comes to us in a
peculiar posture. We have mandamus on top of mandamus. Both sides have in-
voked the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 .... Mandamus, the majority tells us, is
"drastic"; it is available only in "extraordinary situations"; it is hardly ever granted;
those invoking the court's mandamus jurisdiction must have a "clear and indispu-
table" right to relief. These words are directed at the federal officers' petition in
this court, but they apply equally to plaintiffs' suits in the district court. See Power
v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In my view, the federal officers
have a clear right to relief in the court of appeals because the plaintiffs do not
have a clear right to relief in the district court. I would therefore grant the writ
and order the district court not only to bar discovery but to dismiss the actions.
In re Cheney, 334 F.3d at 1113 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
31. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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the Vice President a three-page memorandum on the subject of
energy.) Would it be of any consequence that the private person
met individually with some of the members the President ap-
pointed? (There are also allegations to this effect.) And if so, is
there to be discovery of who said what, and how this affected the
work of the Group?
These problems and others are a direct result of AAPS and its lack
of any principled standard for determining who is and who is not a
de facto member of a Presidential committee. For the judiciary to
permit this sort of discovery, authorized in the name of enforcing
FACA-a statute providing no right of action, .... strikes me as a
violation of the separation of powers. The intrusion into the inner
workings of the Presidency, the disruption this intrusion is bound
to entail, the probing of the mental processes of high-level Cabinet
officers inherent in the type of discovery that AAPS sanctions, the
deleterious impact on the advice the President needs to perform
his constitutional duties-all this and more present "formidable
constitutional difficulties," .. . 32
Following the denial of a rehearing en banc, the Vice President
filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which
was granted on December 15, 2003. 33 On January 5, 2003, the duck
hunting incident transpired. The blinding factual backdrop for that
recusal follows in the next section.
C. The Factual Backdrop for the Scalia Recusal
It seems the good Justice, a son (who had never once hunted),
and a son-in-law (hunting experience unknown) hopped a Gulfstream
jet with Vice President Richard B. Cheney. The foursome (along with
Secret Service agents and Cheney staff members, also of unknown
hunting experience) flew to Patterson, Louisiana where they met up
with nine other hunters and three of Mr. Wallace Carline's staff for
five days of duck hunting. 34 On February 23, 2004, the Public Citizen
Litigation Group as well as the Sierra Club hauled them all into court
by filing a motion to recuse. 35
Less than a month later, in a twenty-one page memorandum, Jus-
tice Scalia replied officially to the Sierra Club's request by categori-
cally refusing to disqualify himself from hearing this case. 36 Because
32. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d at 1115 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
33. Cheney v. Dist. Court, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).
34. Mr. Cheney left on Wednesday. Justice Scalia and his son and son-in-law stayed for
the full five days of hunting and returned on a commercial aircraft that flew them from
New Orleans to Washington.
35. See Appellant's Motion to Recuse, Cheney v. Dist. Court, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003)
(No. 03-475), available at 2004 AIL 397220.
36. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (mem).
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the individual disqualification decision by the Supreme Court Justice
is final in recusal cases, Scalia's memorandum, at least ostensibly, set-
tled the matter.37 The Court ruled in the case on June 2004 with a
decision favoring, if not fully vindicating, Cheney's claims. 38 Justice
Scalia did support the seven-member majority in the case.39 That the
case was not a split decision should not mute judicial conflicts analysis
or criticism in this case. Outcome should not control principle, and
the outcome neither analyzes nor explains Scalia's decision to remain
part of the judicial panel.
D. Scalia's Reasoning for Non-Recusal
The criticism aimed at Scalia focused on his insensitivity to a con-
flict of interest. The Justice's hunting trip with his friend, the Vice
President, who was a party to a pending Supreme Court case,
37. United States Supreme Court Justices have settled on certain rules applicable to
recusal cases. These rules require disqualification in cases in which the judge has a finan-
cial stake in the outcome (e.g., holds stock in a corporation that happens to be a party to
the case), in which a relative of the judge is a party to the case, or in which the judge has
manifested an inability to hear the case in an unbiased manner. An example of the latter
case would be one in which the judge has made public statements revealing some bias. See
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916 (addressing the rules, Justice Scalia acknowledged his decision to
disqualify himself from the so-called "pledge of allegiance case" (Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2003))).
38. Cheney v. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). The Court's ruling in briefest terms
was:
Because the issuance of the writ is a matter vested in the discretion of the court to
which the petition is made, and because this Court is not presented with an origi-
nal writ of mandamus, see; e.g., ExpartePeru, 318 U.S. 578, 586 (1943), we leave to
the Court of Appeals to address the parties' arguments with respect to the chal-
lenge to AAPS and the discovery orders. Other matters bearing on whether the
writ of mandamus should issue should also be addressed, in the first instance, by
the Court of Appeals after considering any additional briefs and arguments as it
deems appropriate. We note only that all courts should be mindful of the bur-
dens imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings. Special consid-
erations applicable to the President and the Vice President suggest that the courts
should be sensitive to requests by the Government for interlocutory appeals to
reexamine, for example, whether the statute embodies the de facto membership
doctrine.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is vacated, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id. at 2593. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, filed a dissenting opinion in the
case. Id at 2595 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2576 (majority opinion). Scalia sided with the seven-member majority that
required the Court of Appeals to rule on Cheney's writ of mandamus, but also agreed with
Justice Thomas's dissent that the District Court exceeded its authority. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, in effect, dissected the writ-upon-writ discussed in the dissenting opinion in the
court of appeals decision. See id at 2594 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Summer 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
amounted to the acceptance of a favor from, and therefore at least a
potential partiality to, that party. Scalia's memorandum chastised the
press for getting the facts wrong.40 He had a number of responses to
the assertion of a conflict.
First, Scalia assures that he did not spend time alone with the
Vice President and certainly did not discuss the case, because, as
Scalia notes, everyone in Washington, D.C. knows that is something
you just cannot do. 4 1 It is in this area that Scalia offers what must
surely go down in philosophical and ethical annals as an exception to
conflicts rules: We were never in the same duck blind together:
We spent about 48 hours together at the hunting camp. It was as-
serted that the Vice President and I "spent time alone in the
rushes," "huddled together in a Louisiana marsh," where we had
"plenty of time ... to talk privately" (Los Angeles Times); that we
"spent... quality time bonding together in a duck blind" (Atlanta
Journal-Constitution); and that "[t]here is simply no reason to
think these two did not discuss the pending case" (Buffalo News).
As I have described, the Vice President and I were never in the
same blind, and never discussed the case.
42
A second leg of support for Scalia's decision to deny the motion
for recusal was that Cheney's role as party to this litigation was routine
and certainly congruent with that of any agency head or cabinet
official:
It is said, however, that this case is different because the federal
officer (Vice President Cheney) is actually a named party. This is by
no means a rarity. At the beginning of the current Term, there
40. Justice Scalia's son and son-in-law, not his daughter as some claimed, accompa-
nied him on the flight with Cheney. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921. Other facts that were wrong in
the press include:
" Wallace Carline is not an energy executive or oil industrialist. He owns a small
company that rents equipment for oil rigs;
" It was not a private jet, but a government jet (as required by security concerns
for the Vice President);
" An energy or oil company did not pay for the flight;
" He was not Cheney's guest; they were both Carline's guests;
" Cheney did not invite Scalia; Scalia invited Cheney, and the invitation was made
before the writ in the NEPDG case was filed by the Vice President; and
* The trip was forty-eight hours, not several days.
Id. at 914-15.
41. Justice Scalia put in parenthesis: "(Washington officials know the rules, and know
that discussing with judges pending cases-their own or anyone else's-is forbidden.)" Id.
at 927. Taking judicial notice of the fact that no one in Washington either breaks rules or
discusses anything they should not flies in the faces of Bob Woodward, Carl Bernstein,
Michael Isikoff, Mark Feldt (a.k.a. Deep Throat), and a host of Washington-based reporters
who have broken stories that involved both rule-breaking and discussions that were forbid-
den by law, propriety, and other conversation-constraining mores.
42. Id. at 927.
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were before the Court (excluding habeas actions) no fewer than 83
cases in which high-level federal Executive officers were named in
their official capacity-more than 1 in every 10 federal cases then
pending. That an officer is named has traditionally made no differ-
ence to the proposition that friendship is not considered to affect
impartiality in official-action suits. Regardless of whom they name,
such suits, when the officer is the plaintiff, seek relief not for him
personally but for the Government; and, when the officer is the
defendant, seek relief not against him personally, but against the
Government. 43
Justice Scalia also argues that no conflict existed because he took
nothing of value from the Vice President. He appears to believe that
some sort of monetary gain is necessary before the issue of a conflict
of interest can arise. The reasoning appears to go as follows: Because
Justice Scalia had only a coach ticket (one concludes first class might
be a conflict), there was nothing of value given to him, ergo, no con-
flict. He explains:
Let me speak first to the value, though that is not the principal
point. Our flight down cost the Government nothing, since space-
available was the condition of our invitation. And, though our
flight down on the Vice President's plane was indeed free, since we
were not returning with him we purchased (because they were least
expensive) round-trip tickets that cost precisely what we would
have paid if we had gone both down and back on commercial
flights. In other words, none of us saved a cent by flying on the
Vice President's plane. 44
Somehow the value of a private jet flight (one way) escapes his analy-
sis. The monetary savings are not the issue, the benefit to him is.
Next, in a classic freshman error in ethical analysis, Justice Scalia
resorts to the rationalization, "Everybody else does it," and thus, it is
ethical and not a conflict of interest. This argument appears to be
Scalia assuring us that everyone on the Court socializes and indeed
had socialized with the Cheneys after the petition had been filed. Nev-
ertheless, he assures, they had no impropriety either:
While this matter was pending, Justices and their spouses were in-
vited (all of them, I believe) to a December 11, 2003, Christmas
reception at the residence of the Vice President-which included
an opportunity for a photograph with the Vice President and Mrs.
Cheney. Several of the Justices attended, and in doing so they were
fully in accord with the proprieties. 45
Scalia maintains that no conflict of interest existed because he
took the plane ride with the Vice President so as not to inconvenience
43. Id. at 921-22.
44. Id. at 923.
45. Id. at 924.
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the transportation logistics. Again, Justice Scalia appears to be offer-
ing practical reasons for doing what he did:
The purpose of going with him was not saving money, but avoiding
some inconvenience to ourselves (being taken by car from New
Orleans to Morgan City) and considerable inconvenience to our
friends, who would have had to meet our plane in New Orleans,
and schedule separate boat trips to the hunting camp, for us and
for the Vice President's party. (To be sure, flying on the Vice Presi-
dent's jet was more comfortable and more convenient than flying
commercially; that accommodation is a matter I address in the
next paragraph.) 46
Judicial carpooling could also save time and money, but distance from
defendants, lawyers, and jurors removes that ex parte taint from the
proceedings.
Scalia uses the issue of a bobtailed, :or tied, Court to argue that
recusing himself will actually hurt the Sierra Club. Self-recusal by a
Supreme Court Justice reduces the deciding members by one, thus
creating the real possibility of a tie vote. This, argues Scalia, actually
favors the respondent who wins in the case of a tie. 4 7 Other courts,
such as the court of appeals, can simply replace the recused judge
with another judge on the court.48 The Supreme Court, however, does
not have the luxury of cherry-picking substitutes for disqualified
judges.
Scalia insists that socializing with government litigants has always
been done. He argues that he, like many of his predecessors on the
Court, can be impartial in a case in which a Justice admits a friendship
with a named party to the case. In fact, he cites two cases in which
Justices cavorted with named parties during pending cases. In the
first, Justice Byron White went skiing with Attorney General Robert
Kennedy when two pending cases involving "Robert Kennedy, in his
46. Id. at 921. The point Justice Scalia makes in the next paragraph is that all the
government officials accept rides on government planes and that doing so is not a violation
of the Ethics Act. Id. "Everybody does this," is, of course, also one of the profound syllo-
gisms of philosophy and ethics.
47. "The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a
tie vote, it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case."
Id. at 916. Scalia also quotes the 1993 Court policy on recusal:
[W]e do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond the require-
ments of the statute, and to recuse ourselves, out of an excess of caution, when-
ever a relative is a partner in the firm before us or acted as a lawyer at an earlier
stage. Even one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court.
Id. A later section develops the issue of a bobtailed Court more fully. See infra notes 158-63
and accompanying text.
48. Cheney, 541 U.S at 916.
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official capacity as Attorney General," were before the Court.49 In the
other, Scalia cited Justice Robert Jackson's close personal friendship
with President Franklin Roosevelt and the Justice's car ride with
Roosevelt to a party in Virginia as a pending case involving the scope
of New Deal actions under the Commerce Clause was before the
Court.50
In a classic response to many caught in a conflict of interest issue,
Justice Scalia issued the popular, "How could you think that I could be
bought for so little?" Indeed, his penultimate paragraph in the deci-
sion on the recusal motion includes the following:
The question, simply put, is whether someone who thought I could
decide this case impartially despite my friendship with the Vice
President would reasonably believe that I cannot decide it impar-
tially because I went hunting with that friend and accepted an invi-
tation to fly there with him on a Government plane. If it is
reasonable to think that a Supreme CourtJustice can be bought so
cheap, the Nation is in deeper trouble than I had imagined.
51
Finally, Scalia argues that newspaper editors should not decide
judicial conflicts because they do not know the law. He cites the mo-
tion of the Sierra Club that includes data on the position of editorial
boards of newspapers around the country: eight of the ten newspapers
with the largest circulation in the United States, fourteen of the larg-
49. Id at 918. The two cases were Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963)
and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Actually, Justice Scalia has a number
of examples. One can only imagine the research his law clerks had to do to dig up the
following:
Justice Stone tossed around a medicine ball with members of the Hoover adminis-
tration mornings outside the White House. 2 HERBERT C. HOOVER, MEMOIRS OF
HERBERT HOOVER 327 (1952). Justice Douglas was a regular at President Franklin
Roosevelt's poker parties; Chief Justice Vinson played poker with President Tru-
man. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 511 (1992);J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEr.
THE LIFE OF WILL 0. DOUGLAS 220-21 (1980). A no-friends rule would have
disqualified much of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), the case that challenged President Truman's seizure of the steel mills.
Most of the Justices knew Truman well, and four had been appointed by him. See
MCCULLOUGH, supra. A no-friends rule would surely have required Justice
Holmes's recusal in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), the
case that challenged President Theodore Roosevelt's trust-busting initiative. See
SHELDON NOViCK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 264
(1989) ("Holmes and Fanny dined at the White House every week or two.").
What on earth is a medicine ball? And can you use it in a duck blind?
50. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 918. The case was Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).Jus-
tice Scalia notes that although Roosevelt was not the named party-Wickard was
Roosevelt's Secretary of Agriculture-the President was vitally interested in the outcome of
Wickard, which defined the scope of federal authority (i.e., Commerce Clause jurisdiction)
as exercised by the Roosevelt administration.
51. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 928-29.
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est twenty, and twenty of the thirty largest called for Scalia's recusal.
Scalia is dismissive: "The implications of this argument are staggering.
I must recuse because a significant portion of the press, which is
deemed to be the American public, demands it."52
Nothing in these reasons is a credible response to the assertion
thatJustice Scalia had a conflict of interest. Nor does Scalia's response
ever address the public perception that his duck hunting trip with
Cheney created an appearance of partiality that can have a long-term,
negative effect on the Court.53 Indeed, the dismissive shallowness of
the points outlined above indicates a failure to grasp the very basics of
conflicts of interest along with a lack of sensitivity about appearance
and perceptions. Without closer scrutiny, the issue ofjudicial conflicts
is swept up in a whimsical fashion that Scalia capitalizes upon because
of the nature of the activity. The crux ofjudicial recusal depends, in
this case, on whetherJustice Scalia has violated the established princi-
ples of conflict of interest as they apply to judicial disqualification.
The sections dealing with conflicts of interest and their application to
judicial recusal cases are covered following a summary of the Ginsburg
issues.
11. Ginsburg and NOW: It Is a "Lovely Thing"
A. The Factual Backdrop
When the Sierra Club filed its motion to have Justice Scalia re-
cuse himself, conservative watch-dog groups engaged in tit-for-tat and
demanded that Ruth Bader Ginsburg recuse herself from several cases
involving abortion issues because of a lectureship called, oddly, the
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture Series on Women
and the Law. The lecture series named in honor of the Justice is spon-
sored by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund.5 4 The watch-dogs
pointed out that Justice Ginsburg was prepared to vote on cases in
which NOW had filed amicus curae brief. Indeed, just two weeks prior
to a NOW Legal Defense Fund speech and appearance, Justice Gins-
burg had cast a favorable vote for NOW's position as an amicus in a
52. Id. at 926.
53. Steven Lubit, Was Cheney Aiming for More Than Ducks?, STAR T~aB. (Minneapolis),
Feb. 3, 2004, at 15A. Lubit claims that Scalia's response to calls for recusal merited a more
serious and thoughtful answer: "In contrast, Scalia has displayed an unfortunate, and ill-
timed, chumminess with the Vice President. Worse, he has flaunted it by brushing off legit-
imate questions about his impartiality." Id.
54. The name has been changed to Legal Momentum. See Legal Momentum Home
Page, http://www.legalmomentum.org (last visited July 18, 2005) for more information.
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case.55 Twelve Republican members of Congress also wrote a joint let-
ter to Justice Ginsburg demanding her recusal in all cases in which
NOW has filed "friend of the court" briefs. 56
Justice Ginsburg's response to the criticism was that the lecture
series of her namesake "is not a money-making enterprise. I think and
thought and still think it's a lovely thing. Let the lecture speak for
itself."57
Before being appointed to the United States Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Ginsburg had a career-long history of activism on women's rights
and was affiliated with similar groups in an employment as well as vol-
unteer capacity. 58 She has not severed those ties despite the fact that
these groups are regular parties or, at a minimum, amicus, in the most
55. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004). The case was one brought by a group of
mothers who were participants in the Medicaid program. Under a consent decree with the
federal government, Texas was required to meet certain federal requirements, including
that it have an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment ("EPSDT") pro-
gram for children. As mothers of children eligible for EPSDT services in Texas they sought
injunctive relief against state agencies and various state officials, claiming that the Texas
program did not meet federal requirements. NOW's position was that the state was re-
quired, Eleventh Amendment notwithstanding, to comply with the federal mandates. The
decision was a unanimous one, andJustice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. See id.
56. Melanie Hunter, Republicans Ask Justice Ginsburg to Recuse Herself From Abortion Cases,
CNSNEws.cOM, Mar. 23, 2004. The letter from the Congressmen to Justice Ginsburg in-
cluded the following:
It is well known that NOW Legal Defense engages in active lobbying on behalf of
pro-abortion activists and regularly submits briefs to the Supreme Court in a vari-
ety of cases.... As a matter of fact, an entire section of the NOW Legal Defense
website is dedicate [sic] to cases that are heard before the High Court. Further-
more, the NOW Legal Defense homepage highlights your speaking engagement
and pictures you next to the President of the organization, Kathy Rodgers.
Id.
57. David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Ginsburg Stands by Involvement with Group;
The Supreme Court Justice Says She and Her Colleagues Should Avoid Recusing Themselves from
Cases Because They Can't Be Replaced, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, atA14 [hereinafter Stands].
58. Justice Ginsberg's employment history:
1972-1973 Founder and Director, ACLU Women's Rights Project
1973-1980 General Counsel, ACLU
1972-1980 Professor, Columbia University School of Law
1974 Published with KENNETH DAVIDSON & HERMA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS ON SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION
1977-1978 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Stanford,
California
1980-1993 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit
1993- Present Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women's Rights
Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 242 (2002).
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contentious and sociologically sensitive cases that come before the
Court.59
59. In an introduction of the Justice for a speech at Southwestern University Law
School, Professor James Kushner used the following list of Justice Ginsburg's dissents in
cases, cases in which groups she has or has had affiliations with were either parties or
amicus:
So, if we take a look at her dissents while serving on the court, a Ginsburg Court
would create a society with the following: The disabled could sue states for em-
ployment discrimination based on handicap. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).... Cable television would be freed from
program content regulation under the "must carry" provisions and First Amend-
ment protection would be enhanced. Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 229
(1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Members of the uniformed services could wear
religious headgear like a yarmulke. Goldman v. Sec'y of Def., 739 F.2d 657, 660
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), affd sum nom. Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Congress ultimately accepted Justice Ginsburg's po-
sition in 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000) by allowing the wearing of religious apparel while
wearing a uniform) .... The Ku Klux Klan could not erect a cross on the State
Capitol grounds. Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). State universities would not be funding religious publi-
cations with student fees. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 865
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). Congress would not be subsidizing religious
schools. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Re-
medial instructors could not teach in parochial schools. Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 240 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). Schools would not be able to pro-
mote religion by offering meeting places and school facilities to religious entities
including children's religious clubs. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 135 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting). Congress could stop children from
taking guns to school. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). States could regulate cigarette advertising targeted at children.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Congress would have the power to require the police to check the criminal
records of those buying guns. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress would be authorized to allow a cause of action
for gender-based violence. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655-56
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Kansas City and other American cities would have
a chance to desegregate schools. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 142 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting). The district judge in desegregation cases would be al-
lowed to order adequate funding to raise student achievement to approximate
that of a desegregated system. Id. States would be permitted to use Congressional
districting authority to assure that racial minorities have a reasonable opportunity
to elect their chosen representatives. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1003 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress would be authorized to use affirmative action.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The United States could provide foreign aid that is directed to organizations
that engage in population control, abortions, or abortion counseling. DKT
Mem'l. Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). States could require the
Boy Scouts to cease sexual orientation discrimination in the selection of scout
leaders. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Daly, 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Topless and all nude bar dancing would be accorded the First Amendment
protection enjoyed by other forms of entertainment, dance, and art. Erie v. Pap's
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B. Ginsburg's Reasons for Non-Recusal
In a lecture to law students at the University of Connecticut at
Hartford in March 2004, Justice Ginsburg also offered her reasons for
not seeing a conflict in her affiliations with advocacy groups coming
before the Court. First, she noted that the groups are nonprofits and
that she does not make money from the groups. However, the flaw in
the analysis is that the groups do indeed use Justice Ginsburg's name
and the lecture series for raising funds.60 The lecture series is a spon-
sored event with donations and tickets, and the funds are used for
purposes of advancing cases and positions as well as legislative involve-
ment. Justice Ginsburg is loaning her name to a venture that may be
non-profit but is not without funds and the need for raising them.61
She also noted that if she owned just one share of GM stock, she
would recuse herself from a case involving GM.62
As Scalia,63 Justice Ginsburg offered the "if there's a tie, it hurts
the petitioner" argument. Justice Ginsburg said at the same speech at
the University of Connecticut,
On the Supreme Court, if one of us is out, that means there are
only eight. There is a risk we will not be able to decide the case-
that it will be divided evenly. Some of my colleagues think a recusal
in the Supreme Court is equivalent to a vote against the
petitioner. 64
Justice Ginsburg also argues that there is no one to replace a
United States Supreme Court Justice in the event of recusal. She as-
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 317 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). And, a Ginsburg Court
would allow Florida to count its Presidential ballots. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
James Kushner, Introducing Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Predicting the Performance of a Ginsburg
Court, 2003 Sw. U. L. Rav. 181, 186-88.
60. However, Justice Ginsburg has provided items for a NOW auction for raising
funds for its Political Action Committee. Nat'l Org. for Women, 1998 Women's Rights
Convention and Vision Summit NOW PAC Auction Items, http://www.nowpacs.org/
events/auction98.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
61. Ties, supra note 4, at Al. The website for Legal Momentum has a screen for dona-
tions, several screens for selling items, and several screens with its United States Supreme
Court victories (see supra, note 59 forJustice Ginsburg's votes in those cases) and its pend-
ing cases in which it is a party or an amicus. To be fair and balanced, as the Fox News folks
would say (see Fox News Channel Home Page, http://www.foxnews.com), Justice Scalia
traipses about the country speaking to similar groups such as the Urban Family Council,
but, he is not above duck hunting with a party in a case. See CBS News, Scalia Speech
Under Scrutiny, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/08/supremecourt/printable
604612.shtml, for the Urban Council speech, which was also in February 2004.
62. Ties, supra note 4, at Al.
63. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
64. Stands, supra note 57, at A14.
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sures that when she was on the federal court of appeals, and there was
any doubt, she did recuse herself because they could just then slip in
any old judge to take her place. 65
Justice Ginsburg maintains that the appearance of partiality is not
a conflict of interest. She notes that the hoopla over Justice Scalia's
and her activities do not focus on actual judicial standards, rules, or
codes of ethics, but just the appearance of impropriety and a per-
ceived lack of impartiality.66
As the Los Angeles Times describes it, "Ginsburg described those
stories [about Scalia and the duck hunting] as 'on one side of the
political spectrum.' The story about her relationship with the NOW
legal defense fund came later, she said, because 'the L.A. Times
wanted to give equal treatment' to a liberal Justice like herself."67 In
her mind the only justification for raising the issue was that attacks
must be balanced along ideological lines. This argument is a "we must
give equal time to liberal bashing after a good conservative bashing"
dismissal of the meritorious issues raised in the conflicts questions.
Justice Ginsburg indicates that she does not know where all of
this debate on conflicts is headed but that, "[i]n the end, it's a deci-
sion the individual Justice makes, but always with consultation among
the rest of us." 68
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes the need for judicial autonomy and
independence. In a speech she gave at the University of Melbourne
on the topic of judicial independence she reveals that federal judges
need to be free to do the following: (1) bring their views and ideolo-
gies to the bench; (2) be free from inquiry and impeachment for their
decisions; and (3) be free to travel, write, and give lectures as a profes-
sional service even when the lectures include paid travel and involve
exotic locations. 69
65. Justice Ginsburg described her conflicts issues on the court of appeals as follows,
"if there was any doubt, I would say, 'I'll skip this one.'" Id.
66. Id. This may be the only time in their tenure together that Scalia and Ginsburg
find themselves in the same boat and on the same side of an issue. See Lawrence Sirovich, A
Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme Court, 100 PNAS 7432, 7432-37 (2003),
available at http://camelot.mssm.edu/publications/larry/supreme-court-msjfinal.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2005).
67. Stands, supra note 57, at A14.
68. Id.
69. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 72 AusTRALuAN LJ. 611
(1998).
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Justice Ginsburg even chastises the other branches of government
and the public for hounding judges because of "a certain jealousy
(federal judges have life tenure and face no periodic campaigns).70
It is in those remarks, more so than anything said before or after,
that Justice Ginsburg reveals the same disdain for perception and
views of those outside the Court and the judiciary.71 In criticizing Rep.
Tom DeLay's proposal for more activism in impeachment of federal
judges who do not follow the law, she remarked, "Mr. DeLay, who is
not a lawyer, but, I'm told, an exterminator by profession, places on
his list of judicial pests a district court judge in San Antonio, Texas
who held up a certification of the election of two Republican victors in
races for county sheriff and county commissioner."7 2 The federal
judge was correct in his holding and Mr. DeLay wrong, but the disdain
with which this Justice treats him is surprising.
Justice Ginsburg's telling quote in her speech on ideology and
the bench comes not from judicial precedent or even jurisprudence
but from New York Times editorial writer Bob Herbert, "An intimidated
judge is a worthless judge."78 There is no qualification offered on how
and why a judge may be intimidated.
As with Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg's reasoning begs the ques-
tion of whether they have a conflict of interest. Neither she nor Scalia
ever address this issue. They only argue why, even if there is a conflict,
they are justified in remaining on the bench during a case. In not
addressing the specific conflict or even acknowledging its potential,
they weaken the judiciary through their inability to grapple with the
perceptions of the public regarding the lack of impartiality. The
flawed reasoning, coupled with the insensitivity toward an ethical stan-
dard apart from their perceived self-importance and circumstantial
criticality, only serve to heighten the intensity of outside remedies for
judicial overstepping. The following sections do provide the backdrop
for the analysis and discussion that both Justices Ginsburg and Scalia
should have had at the time the issues of their conflicts of interest
arose.
70. Id. at 621.
71. Justice Ginsburg has extensive words on the Bush v. Gore case, and those words are
all from the commentary about the Court, whether it should have intervened at all, and
whether its intervention was appropriate. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 622 (citing Bob Herbert, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000,
at A29).
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HI. Conflicts of Interest
A. General Principles
As much as we "know them when we see them,' 7 4 not a great deal
is written about conflicts of interest. An unscientific review of the top-
ics in four ethics texts found that "conflicts of interest" was not listed
as a separate topic. 75 Nonetheless, conflicts of interest are an issue in
every profession, for every company, and in all government
agencies. 76
74. The quote is a reference to Justice Potter Stewart's view on what constitutes por-
nography, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced... [b]ut I know it when I see it."Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964).
75. See generally THOMAS DONALDSON, PATRICIA WERHANE & MARGARET CORDING, ETHI-
CAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH (2002); AL GINI, CASE STUDIES IN Busi-
NESS ETHICS (2003); ON MORAL BUSINESS (Max L. Stackhouse et al. eds., 1995); PETER
SINGER, ETHICS (1994).
76. In medicine, see, for example, David Orendicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less:
Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 161-62 (1996); Daniel P. Sulmasy,
Physicians, Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 920, 920-21 (1992); Robert
M. Veatch, Physicians and Cost Containment: The Ethical Conflict, 30 JUiMETRICS J. 461,
466-70 (1990) (discussing costs and patient obligations and the conflict between the physi-
cian's oath and the need to economize). In journalism, see, for example, Soc'y of Prof'l
Journalists, Code of Ethics, available at http://www.spj.org/ethics-code.asp (last visited
May 31, 2005), providing the following guidelines:
Act Independently
Journalists should be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's
right to know.
Journalists should:
" Avoid conflicts of interest, real or perceived;
" Remain free of associations and activities that may compromise integrity or
damage credibility;
" Refuse gifts, favors, fees, free travel and special treatment, and shun secondary
employment, political involvement, public office and service in community or-
ganizations if they compromise journalistic integrity;
" Disclose unavoidable conflicts;
" Be vigilant and courageous about holding those with power accountable;
" Deny favored treatment to advertisers and special interests and resist their pres-
sure to influence news coverage; and
" Be wary of sources offering information for favors or money; avoid bidding for
news.
Id. See, for example, Wells Fargo, Code of Ethics: Avoid Conflicts of Interest, available at
http://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/ethics/section5.jhtml (last visited Feb. 9,
2005), for a sample corporate policy on conflicts:
Team members must avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts of
interest in their personal and business activities. The appearance of a conflict of
interest may be just as damaging to the reputation of Wells Fargo as the existence
of an actual conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is a situation in which your
personal interest or outside economic interest in a matter:
0 interferes with your duties and responsibilities to Wells Fargo;
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Whether codified formally, adopted as policy in an employee
handbook, or handled on an ad hoc basis, rules governing conflicts of
interest, because they anticipate rather than respond directly to
agency problems, are prophylactic. 77 Such conflicts arise in agency re-
lationships because of misalignment of incentives between principals
and agents. 78 The last few years have offered a plethora of conflicts
cases that have been covered extensively by the media. Anecdotally,
conflicts of interest have been a subject of media scrutiny as well as
media involvement. Sometimes the misalignment of incentives caused
by conflicts of interest manifests itself in acts of corruption such as
those that brought down corporate giants such as Enron, 79
WorldCom,80 and Adelphia.8' In each of those cases, corporate
" may be inconsistent or incompatible with your obligation to exercise your best
judgment in pursuit of the interests of Wells Fargo;
" results in an improper personal benefit as a result of your position with Wells
Fargo;
" encroaches on the time that you should devote to your work with Wells Fargo;
or
" raises a reasonable question about or the appearance of such interference.
See also Duke Energy, Code of Business Ethics, Conflicts of Interest, available at http://www.
duke-energy.com/investors/governance/ethics/conflict.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2004) ("A
conflict of interest exists any time an employee faces a choice between what is in his or her
personal interest (financial or otherwise) and the interests of Duke Energy. When a con-
flict of interest arises, others may question our integrity. Therefore, employees are account-
able for acting in Duke Energy's best interests and carefully avoiding even the appearance
of acting inappropriately. If you find yourself in a position where your objectivity may be
questioned because of individual interests or family or personal relationships, notify your
supervisor immediately.").
See N.Y. State Governor's Office of Employee Relations, Conflicts of Interest, available at
http://www.goer.state.ny.us/train/onlinelearning/ETH/200.html (last visited Aug. 15,
2005) for a sample government policy ("New York State ethics laws instruct State employ-
ees in how they can avoid conflicts of interest. Some conflicts of interest may be easy to
identify and avoid. For example, awarding contracts to friends or family members, or filing
an appeal on behalf of a client against your own State agency, would constitute conflicts of
interest. This module examines particular actions which could comprise a conflict of
interest.").
77. See ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERicAN PUBLIC LIFE 23 (2000).
78. Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction 4 (Norman E. Bowie & E. Edward
Freeman eds., 1992). Applied first as a means by which economists can develop a theory of
the firm, agency theory evolved into a more normative tool hoping to "develop the proper
system of incentives so that the interests of managers comes into alignment with the inter-
ests of shareholders." Id. at 4.
79. See Primer on Enron, supra note 21, at 163 for a full discussion of the officer corrup-
tion at Enron; see also Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 337 (2003) (criticizing the economics orientation
of agency theory as it applies to corporate fraud cases, such as Enron, based on the theory's
generalized as opposed to behavioral approach).
80. See Marianne M. Jennings, Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist
Paper on Corporate Governance-Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the
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agents-CEOs and other executives-acted, or are alleged to have ac-
ted, in a manner contrary to the best interest of their principals, mul-
tinational corporations. 82 Conflicts were not limited to corporations.
The professions themselves also experienced questions about align-
ments of loyalties and duties to clients. The litigation against the fi-
nancial analysts and the reforms in audit practice were the result of
conflicts of interest. 83 Cases in which favors are exchanged for kick-
'Yeehaw Culture' in Organizations, 3 Wvo. L. REV. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Restoring Ethical
Gumption] for a full discussion of the conflicts and mishaps at WorldCom and Adelphia.
81. Id.
82. For example, at Enron, Andrew Fastow was busily spinning debt off Enron's books
into special purposes entities ("SPEs") under the now-defunct FASB 125. Mr. Fastow was
also serving as a principal in many of the SPEs and earning commissions for the transfer of
assets from Enron to the SPEs. Primer on Enron, supra note 21, at 208. Interestingly, Enron's
conflict of interest policy provided,
Employees of Enron Corp., its subsidiaries, and its affiliated companies (collec-
tively the "Company") are charged with conducting their business affairs in accor-
dance with the highest ethical standards. An employee shall not conduct himself
or herself in a manner which directly or indirectly would be detrimental to the
best interests of the Company or in a manner which would bring to the employee
financial gain separately derived as a direct consequence of his or her employ-
ment with the company.
ENRON, CODE OF ETHICS, EXECUTIVE AND MANAGEMENT 12 (2000). At WorldCom, the board
made such extensive personal loans to former CEO Bernie Ebbers that the WorldCom
stock that he pledged as collateral for the loans became so amassed that sales of shares to
satisfy the loans would have sent the market for the stock into a tailspin because the size of
the block could have moved market price. Restoring Ethical Gumption, supra note 80, at 447.
At Adelphia, company funds were used for investments in the Rigas's children's private
business ventures and competition by family members for the purchase of cable systems.
Id. at 486-87.
83. Jack Grubman's (Salomon Smith Barney Analyst) involvement in allocation of
IPO shares to Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom in exchange for favorable financial reports on
WorldCom was legendary even prior to WorldCom's collapse. Susan Pulliam et al.,
WorldCom Is Denounced at Hearing, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at A3. See Restoring Ethical
Gumption, supra note 79, at 446-48 and Charles Gasparino et al., Salomon Made IPO Alloca-
tions Available to Ebbers, Others, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at Al, for more details. E-mails,
the crux of the revelations, and conflicts cases against analysts revealed interesting relation-
ships. Mr. Grubman was the father of twins who he wanted to see admitted to one of
Manhattan's most prestigious preschools, 92nd Street Y. Mr. Grubman wrote a memo to
Sanford Weill, the chairman of Citigroup, with the following language:
On another matter, as I alluded to you the other day, we are going through the
ridiculous but necessary process of pre-school applications in Manhattan. For
someone who grew up in a household with a father making $8,000 a year and for
someone who attended public schools, I do find this process a bit strange, but
there are no bounds for what you do for your children.
Anything, anything you could do Sandy would be greatly appreciated. As I men-
tioned, I will keep you posted on the progress with AT&T which I think is going
well.
Thank you.
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backs,84 agents embezzle their principal's funds, vendors are given
preference by customers and employees based on family or friendship
rather than merit,85 and self-dealing operations where agents profit
from direct dealings with, and at the expense of, their principal are
other examples.8 6 These actions are both unseemly and potentially
criminal because the agent acted on his individual incentive and at his
Charles Gasparino et al., Ghosts of E-Mails Continue to Haunt Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
2002, at Cl, C13. Citigroup pledged $1 million to the school at about the same time Grub-
man's children were admitted. Id. at Cl.
Mr. Weill, Mr. Grubman's CEO, asked Mr. Grubman to "take a fresh look" at AT&T, a
major corporate client of Citigroup. Id. at Cl. Mr. Weill served on the board of AT&T and
AT&T's CEO, C. Michael Armstrong, served as a Citigroup director and Mr. Weill was
courting Armstrong's vote for the ouster of his co-chairman at Citigroup, John Reed. Id. at
Cl.
A follow-up e-mail from Mr. Grubman to Carol Cutler, another New York analyst, con-
nected the dots:
"I used Sandy to get my kids in the 92nd Street Y pre-school (which is harder than
Harvard) and Sandy needed Armstrong's vote on our board to nuke Reed in
showdown. Once the coast was clear for both of us (i.e., Sandy clear victor and my
kids confirmed) I went back to my normal self" on AT&T.
Id. at Cl. At the same time as all the other movements, Mr. Grubman upgraded AT&T
from a "hold" to a "strong buy." After Mr. Reed was ousted, Mr. Grubman downgraded
AT&T again. Mr. Grubman said that he sent the e-mail "in an effort to inflate my profes-
sional importance." Gretchen Morgenson, Deals Within Telecom Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2002, § BU, at 10. These are conflicts on top of conflicts on top of conflicts.
84. The case against Frank Quattrone of Credit Suisse First Boston was one involving
felony charges brought for his destruction of documents that were related to his company's
system for awarding first crack at IPO shares in exchange for investment banking business
from those who were given the shares for their personal portfolios. Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Ex-Banker Tells Court File Cleanup Was Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Cl, C9. There was
money to be made if you got first crack at these shares. For example, the shares of VA
Linux Systems Inc, climbed 697.5% on their first day of public sales. Linda Himelstein &
Steve Hamm, Inside Frank Quattrone's Money Machine, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at 104. Those
who received the allocations were called "Friends of Frank." And they in turn brought their
investment banking business for their own companies to Credit Suisse First Boston, Frank's
company. Thor Valdmanis & Greg Farrell, Quattrone Guilty, USA TODAY, May 4, 2004, at lB.
85. See Himelstein & Hamm, supra note 84, at 104.
86. Purchasing agent Jim G. Locklear was a housewares buyer with J.C. Penney and
was responsible for the very successful J.C. Penney Home Collection, a color-coordinated
line of dinnerware, flatware, and glasses that was eventually copied by most other tabletop
retailers. Locklear took sales of Penney's tabletop line from $25 million to $45 million per
year and was named the company's "Buyer of the Year" several times. Nevertheless,
Locklear was taking payments from Penney's vendors directly and through front compa-
nies. Some paid him for information about bids or to obtain contracts, while others paid
what they believed to be advertising fees to various companies that were fronts owned by
Locklear. Between 1987 and 1992, Locklear took in $1.5 million in "fees" from Penney's
vendors. Andrea Gerlin, How a Penney Buyer Made Up to $1.5 Million on Vendors' Kickbacks,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at Al, A18. He entered a plea and was sentenced to eighteen
months in prison and fined $50,000. Penney was also awarded a $789,000judgment against
him. Andrea Gerlin, J C. Penney Ex-Employee Sentenced to Jail WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at
Al.
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principal's expense.87 More recently, conflicts charges have arisen as
media commentators, pundits, have revealed that even as they advo-
cated reform proposals in their writings, they were being paid by re-
form groups for consulting, research, public relations, and other
activities related to the reforms.88
Conflict of interest policies hope to prevent, manage, or mitigate
the consequences arising from situations that can spawn such acts.89
While the conflict itself may be unseemly, the ultimate goal of such
rules is to prevent an agent from deviating from the principal's
wishes.90 Accepting gifts from outsiders with whom one's company or
agency has contracts or other relationships creates the negative ap-
pearance of impropriety despite the acceptor's appeal that such gifts
did not influence his decisions as the company's agent.91 Accepting
87. Stark, supra note 77, at 22.
88. Annstrong Williams was a proponent of the "No Child Left Behind" education
reforms of the federal government in both his syndicated columns and on his television
show. He did not, however, disclose that he had been paid $240,000 by the United States
Department of Education for public relations work on the initiative. David D. Kirkpatrick,
TV Host Says U.S. Paid Him to Back Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at Al, A1O. Columnist
Maggie Gallagher was paid $21,500 by the Department of Health and Human Services to
help promote the Bush Administration's marriage initiative. Howard Kurtz, Writer Backing
Bush Plan Had Gotten Federal Contract, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2005, at COI, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36545-2005Jan25.html.
89. A common provision in many conflicts of interest policies is "when in doubt, ask
before acting." For example, the Wells Fargo policy on conflicts provides, "[i]f a conflict or
potential conflict of interest arises in circumstances not discussed under the rules that
follow or if application of a rule to a set of circumstances is unclear, you should consult
your supervisor or Code Administrator." Wells Fargo, supra note 76. And in another seg-
ment the same is repeated, "[i]f a conflict or potential conflict of interest arises in circum-
stances not discussed under the rules that follow or if application of a rule to a set of
circumstances is unclear, you should consult your supervisor or Code Administrator." Id.
For example, some physicians have adopted a policy of charging pharmaceutical rep-
resentatives for the right to meet with them for discussing a new drug. The amount they
receive is then given back to the physician's practice as a means of reducing costs, some-
thing the doctors say ultimately benefits their principals, the patients. Cheryl Jackson, Ohio
Group Tells Drug Reps: We'll Listen-If You Pay, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1, 4.
90. Jackson, supra note 89, at 1, 4.
91. See Nolan Clay, Gifts Had No Influence, Fisher Says, DAILY OKIAHOMAN (Oklahoma
City), July 12, 2004, at Al (reporting on Oklahoma state Insurance Commissioner and
United States Senate candidate, Carrol Fisher, who claimed that accepting money for a
charity from those his agency regulates never affected his official decision making). Justice
Scalia noted in his opinion similar reasoning,
There are, I am sure, those who believe that my friendship with persons in the
current administration might cause me to favor the Government in cases brought
against it. That is not the issue here. Nor is the issue whether personal friendship
with the Vice President might cause me to favor the Government in cases in
which he is named. None of those suspicions regarding my impartiality (errone-
ous suspicions, I hasten to protest) bears upon recusal here. The question, simply
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the gift looks untoward, but the greater indiscretion is allowing that
gift to influence an agent's decision at his principal's expense.9 2 Pro-
put, is whether someone who thought I could decide this case impartially despite
my friendship with the Vice President would reasonably believe that I cannot de-
cide it impartially because I went hunting with that friend and accepted an invita-
tion to fly there with him on a Government plane. If it is reasonable to think that
a Supreme CourtJustice can be bought so cheap, the Nation is in deeper trouble
than I had imagined.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2003) (mer.).
92. In some cases, the test for whether a conflict of interest exists is whether the party
would feel comfortable having the public be aware of the conduct, gift, or interests that are
at odds with each other. For example, the American College of Physicians (the largest
medical professional organization outside the American Medical Association) has conflicts
of interest rules for the relationships between physicians and drug companies. More specif-
ically, the rules govern what physicians can and cannot accept from pharmaceutical com-
panies. The conflicts guideline for perks from drug companies is whether the accepting
physician would "be willing to have these arrangements generally known." Daniel Sulmasy,
Am. Coll. of Physicians, Position Paper, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 112 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 624, 624 (1990).
The American Medical Association ("AMA") has created a $1 million educational cam-
paign to discourage doctors from accepting even the smallest of gifts from pharmaceuticals
because of the reality and perception that these gifts influence doctors' decisions on which
drugs to prescribe. Interestingly, the pharmaceutical companies themselves donated
$675,000 of the $1 million. Experts estimate that drug companies spend about $1,500 per
physician per year in trying to attract the physicians' attention to particular drugs in order
to have the doctors prescribe them. Those figures come from the $15.7 billion drug com-
panies spent on marketing in 2000. That figure for marketing was $9 billion in 1996. Jack-
son, supra note 89, at 1, 4.
Below is a list of the various types of benefits and gifts drug companies have given doctors
over the past few years to try and get them to consider prescribing their new offerings:
" An event called "Why Cook?" in which doctors are given the chance to review
drug studies and product information at a restaurant as their meals are being
prepared-they can leave as soon as their meals are ready and they are treated
to appetizers and drinks as they wait;
" An event at Christmas tree lots where doctors can come and review materials
and pick up a free Christmas tree;
* Flowers sent to the doctors' offices on Valentine's Day with materials attached;
* Manicures as they study materials on new drugs;
* Pedicures as they study materials on new drugs;
* Free car washes and they can study materials as their cars are being washed;
* Free books with materials enclosed;
* Free CDs with materials attached;
* Bottles of wine sent with materials attached;
* Events at Barnes & Noble where doctors can browse and pick out a book for
themselves for free so long as they take along some materials on a new drug;
and
• Some doctors say that they can often enjoy dinner on a drug company as often
as five times per week.
The AMA frowns on the "dine and dash" format because its rules provide that dinners
are acceptable so long as the doctors sit and learn something from a featured speaker. The
AMA also limits gifts to those of a "minimal value" that should be related to their patients,
such as note pads and pens with the new drug's name imprinted on them. The chairman
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phylactic conflict of interest rules stem from the difficulty in proving
the latter-that the agent's dealings with an outsider occasioned an
act or omission contrary to the principal's best interest-and from the
relative ease of identifying and addressing such conflicts and their po-
tential harm ex ante facto.93
Andrew Stark explains conflict of interest rules as addressing
"acts that give rise to encumbered states of minds, not the ultimate
acts that flow from them."9 4 In law, the ultimate act would likely be
labeled malum in se because it typically amounts to an impermissible
taking of the principal's property-theft.9 5 When the federal govern-
ment and states adopt conflict of interest laws in their criminal codes,
they are essentially attempting to prevent these types of actions by
prohibiting the ostensible conflicts that may foster the ultimate ma-
lum in se crimes. 96 Criminal laws aimed at stemming conflicts of inter-
est are therefore malum prohibitum laws, not evil or criminal on their
face, but worthy of criminal regulations because of their potentially
nasty consequences. 97 One can easily imagine that critics would assail
of the AMA Committee says the following about the gifts, "There are doctors who say, 'I
always do what's best for my patients, and these gifts and dinners and trips do not influ-
ence me.' They are wrong."
Chris Adams, Doctors on the Run Can 'Dine'n Dash' in Style in New Orleans, WALL ST. J., May 14,
2001, at Al.
93. See generally CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFSSIONS (Michael Davis & Andrew
Stark eds. 2001). One of the editors compares conflict of interest rules to dirt in a sensitive
gage. Whether or to what extent that dirt affects the gage's ability accurately to portray
what it measures does not diminish the facts that it may affect the reading and likely de-
mands attention. Id. at 11-12.
94. STARK, supra note 77, at 23.
95. Malum in se, a wrong in itself, would apply to acts of theft. See BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1112 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
96. For example, at the federal level, there are criminal laws on bribery, grafts, and
conflicts of interest found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (2000). The sections are sometimes
referred to as the Federal Gratuity Act and outline impermissible gifts as well as provide
criminal punishment for those who violate the guidelines. Section 201 provides that any-
one who:
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty ...
directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises. anything of value to any public
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official,
former public official, or person selected to be a public official.., shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §201 (c) (1) (A) (2000).
97. Malum prohibitum crimes are those that may not be inherently immoral, but are
"wrong" because they are prohibited. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1112 (Rev. 4th ed.
1968). Stark notes this distinction between ultimate, wrong acts (malum in se) and conflict
of interest crimes, primarily malum prohibitum. STARK, supra note 77, at 24.
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conflict of interest crimes as premature-they regulate potentially in-
nocent precursor activities instead of proven, harmful conduct.98
B. Regulating Conflicts of Interest: Removal or Management?
Conflict of interest regulation can be quite diverse, but it falls
within two distinct categories: removal or management. Removal, the
cleanest form of regulation, is not always possible. In those situations,
we move to the various layers of managing conflicts.
1. Removal and Conflicts of Interest
Removal does just that-it eliminates the conflict ex ante facto,
thus eliminating potentially more serious consequences. 99 Those in-
98. STARK, supra note 77, at 24-25. Noting that both the American Bar Association
and American Civil Liberties Union have criticized malum prohibitum conflict of interest
laws because they focus on the penultimate rather than ultimate (malum in se) act. Id. In
fact, Justice Scalia has been such a critic. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S.
398 (1999), Justice Scalia found a violation requires proof of a quid pro quo, some connec-
tion between the gifts and the government action. Otherwise, as Scalia described it, all gifts
to government officials would be criminalized:
Talmudic sages believed that judges who accepted bribes would be punished by
eventually losing all knowledge of the divine law. The Federal Government, deal-
ing with many public officials who are not judges, and with at least some judges
for whom this sanction holds no terror, has constructed a framework of human
laws and regulations defining various sorts of impermissible gifts, and punishing
those who give or receive them with administrative sanctions, fines, and incarcera-
tion ....
[Such an interpretation] would criminalize, for example, token gifts to the Presi-
dent based on his official position and not linked to any identifiable act-such as
the replica jerseys given by championship sports teams each year during ceremo-
nial White House visits .... Similarly, it would criminalize a high school princi-
pal's gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary of Education, by reason of his
office, on the occasion of the latter's visit to the school. That these examples are
not fanciful is demonstrated by the fact that counsel for the United States main-
tained at oral argument that a group of farmers would violate § 201 (c)(1)(A) by
providing a complimentary lunch for the Secretary of Agriculture in conjunction
with his speech to the farmers concerning various matters of USDA policy-so
long as the Secretary had before him, or had in prospect, matters affecting the
farmers.... Of course the Secretary of Agriculture always has before him or in
prospect matters that affect farmers,just as the President always has before him or
in prospect matters that affect college and professional sports, and the Secretary
of Education matters that affect high schools.
Id. at 400, 406-07.
Both the language of the opinion and its outcome were foreshadowings of Justice
Scalia's somewhat liberal attitudes about conflicts of interest and government officials.
What is a baseball cap, lunch, or duck hunting trip among friends so long as nothing is
pending and it is all generic influence?
99. STARK, supra note 77, at 235.
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volved recognize the conflict and, via various methods, hope to miti-
gate or eliminate these consequences.100 Removal includes two
different strategies.
In the first, the principal requires, or the agent voluntarily
chooses, disqualification. In such a case, the agent removes herself
from the environment that poses the conflict, thus eliminating it.101
Under the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-
Oxley"),102 auditors are now removed from the conflicts of interest
that were common practice prior to the collapses of WorldCom, En-
ron, Adelphia, Sunbeam, and other companies in which auditors
served dual roles of outside auditor as well as management consultant
and a host of other roles that were generally more lucrative for the
audit firms than the audit fees themselves.10 3 The conflict for auditors
was that pleasing the client on the audit side became the perceived
prerequisite for retention of the more financially rewarding consult-
ing business. 10 4
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). Sarbanes-Oxley is the term used
colloquially, along with SOX, to describe all of the reforms passed by Congress in response
to the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and other companies that had engaged in account-
ing improprieties.
103. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 201, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit to consulting fee ratios were
clearly tilted toward consulting. Following each company is a number in parenthesis that
indicate the ratio of the company's nonaudit fees to its audit fees (as of 2001): Allegheny
Energy (3.1); Ameren (2.3); American Power Conversion (5.1); Apple Computer (12.6);
Avon (2.9); Best Buy (4.4); Boston Properties (4.8); Bristol Myers Squibb (4.5); Constella-
tion Energy Group (4.1); Delphi Automotive Systems (7.7); Dominion Resources (1.2);
Duke Energy (3.5); Equitable Resources (3.9); First Energy (5.9); Gap (13.5); Halliburton
(1.1); John Hancock Financial (9.75); Johnson & Johnson (4.6); Kmart (10.4); Lafarge
North America (3.1); Liz Claiborne (2.2); Manpower (3.6); Marriott International (4.7);
McGraw-Hill (2.2); Motorola (16); PG&E (3.6); Reliant (5.1); TXU (3); VF (5.2); and Walt
Disney (4.1). Deborah Solomon, After Enron, a Push to Limit Accountants to ... Accounting,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at C1; Gary Strauss, Companies Take Action to Regain Investor Trust,
USA TODAY, July 17, 2002, at lB.
104. The list of activities now classified as conflicts under Sarbanes-Oxley include:
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial
statements of the audit client;
2. Financial information systems design and implementation;
3. Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind
reports;
4. Actuarial services;
5. Internal audit outsourcing services;
6. Management functions or human resources;
7. Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
8. Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
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Other types of conflicts may not have statutory prescriptions but
require voluntary removal. For example, a human resource director
for a private corporation may seek reassignment such that her spouse
may qualify for a job with the same company and not be reviewed by
the former director. The conflicts involving journalists and commen-
tators noted earlier are not governed by statute but by professional
codes of ethics. Judicial conflicts may or may not be statutorily pro-
scribed. 10 5 Likewise, with public officials and appointees, the conflicts
standards may or may not be covered by statute. The proper course of
action may not be offered by codified standards and the result is dif-
fering results in the determination of grounds for removal or
recusal. 10 6 When the standards differ, regulating the conflict involves
moving to its management.
2. Managing Conflicts of Interest
For the most part, regardless of whether there is a statutory man-
date or a matter of conflicts interpretation and appearances, a judge
facing a conflict of interest would likely recuse himself or herself from
the case that provokes the conflict. However, as in other fields in
which a conflict arises, there are alternatives such as disclosure and/or
divestiture.10 7 These alternative approaches are often grouped to-
9. Any other service that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
("PCAOB") determines, by regulation, is impermissible.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g) (West. 2003).
105. For example, most states specifically prohibit judges from participating in cases in
which a relative is a party, a witness, or a victim. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2501.13;
In re Disqualification of Nadel, 546 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio 1989) (disqualifying judge as well as
other judges in that county circuit from hearing a case in which judge's wife and infant
were victims of crimes of kidnapping, assault, and aggravated robbery). However, where
the conflict raised involves friendship of the judge or judge's staff, there is not a statutory
prohibition, but there is the application of discretion on the appearance of the conflict.
See, e.g., Celestino v. Schneider, 616 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that friend-
ship with a parent of a party is not necessarily a conflict that requires judicial recusal); State
v. Scott, 578 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that judge's bailiff being married
to defense lawyer did not require recusal). Federal standards are similar under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) (2000). That is, ajudge is not required to recuse himself or herself simply because
of personal familiarity with the parties or witnesses. Hirschkop v. Va. State Bar Ass'n, 406 F.
Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1975).
106. For a complete discussion of federal standards on judicial conflicts, see 8 FEDERAL
PROCEDURE § 20:63-20:89 (2005). Mere acquaintance is insufficient to require recusal. In re
Beard, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987). But, statements about character may or may not re-
quire recusal depending on the extent of the statement. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125
(6th Cir. 1980).
107. For example, in the field ofjournalism, the disclosure by financial reporters and
analysts that they owned stock was no longer deemed sufficient for ensuring integrity in
coverage. New policies at CNBC require journalists and commentators covering financial
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gether in a process referred to as managing the conflict. Managing
conflicts of interest can be effective, even when it does not eliminate
the conflict.
When the conflict is of a financial nature one management tool is
divestiture. Sometimes the agent can eliminate the conflict by divest-
ing himself of a financial interest that provokes the conflict. A judge,
for example, can sell stocks or place them in a blind trust so that she
can rule in cases involving the stock issuers without the existence or
even appearance of a conflict of interest.10 8
Another means of managing a conflict is simply to acknowledge
its existence and balance its effects. The disclosure and management
can occur at varying level in the relationship and processes involved.
With regard to judicial and quasi-judicial roles, there is the generic
conflict between the oath or pledge to be fair and unbiased and the
inevitable ideological framework each of us uses for management of
issues, disputes, and policies. Managing these types of conflicts can
involve a global recognition that there are inherent and inevitable bi-
ases brought to the bench and/or regulatory table when political and
judicial figures are chosen.
We understand, for example, that appointments to certain state
and federal commissions are political and that commissioners bring
some level of bias into their service.' 0 9 Rather than micro-manage the
individual biases, we manage the overarching process to afford checks
and balances for those inherent biases. For example, the relevant stat-
ute governing the Michigan State Ethics Commission requires that no
more than four of the seven members of the state's Board of Ethics be
members of the same political party. 110 Whether the commissioners
bring biases and conflicts into their role tends to be offset by a broad
issues there to no longer own individual stocks. The conflicts policies apply to on-air talent
as well as staff. They are able to own stocks via pension funds. Patrick McGeehan, CNBC
Impose New Rules on Trading by Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at ClI. The most com-
mon policies, however, remain ones of recusal and disclosure. Reporters at theWall Street
Journal may not write about companies in which they own stock. Id. See also Marrianne M.
Jennings, Where Are Our Minds and What Are We Thinking? Virtue Ethics for a "Perfidious" Me-
dia, 19 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 637, 685 (2005) for a more detailed summary
of policies. Other networks require on-air disclosure or ownership and/or recusal. Id.
108. In general, divestiture eliminates the conflict-in private business, it squares with
the notion of fiduciary. Stark notes that it had its origins with the judiciary. STARK, supra
note 77, at 10.
109. Balancing allows individual agency members to bring strong interests into their
deliberations, but also insists that the mix of members is generally representative of the
population it seeks to represent. Id. at 10-11.
110. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4.1700(74) (West 2003). The irony of such a law is not
lost on the authors.
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acknowledgement that such biases may follow them and by a canny
effort to balance those biases based on membership rules.
This balancing provides effective management for ideological
conflicts. The appointment process for United States Supreme Court
Justices carries overarching balances for those ideological types of bi-
ases in that the Justices are presidential appointees, rising to the
bench during different administrations and always confirmed by the
United States Senate, a body that has certainly let its concerns about
ideology known in the hearing and vote processes on Justices.111 Bal-
ancing does not necessarily acknowledge specific cases of conflict of
interest and may not be the best way to manage specific conflicts. Nev-
ertheless, a policy decision to manage biases and conflicts in this man-
ner, mitigating the potential for a conflict by diversifying members
and thus reducing the conflict inherent in an agency's collective
voice, can be an effective foil for individual conflicts. 112
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg's present conflict, at issue in this
discussion, is different from the global ideological conflicts that are
resolved through the appointment process. Her conflict relates to a
relationship, not just her ideology and, as such, requires not just more
discussion but additional tools for management of conflicts beyond
the global tool of balancing. Justice Ginsburg's conflict is an ongoing
relationship with a continuing party to women's rights cases as well as
her allowing her name to be used by that party's for its activities and
fundraisers.
Likewise, Justice Scalia has brought his ideological views on abor-
tion to the bench and those views are managed by the balancing of
appointments to the Court. However, the conflict alleged presently is
not ideological, but involves personal friendship and interaction with
a party in a case. Understanding that humans cannot separate them-
selves from a lifetime of experience and interaction, ideological con-
flicts are managed. Specific conflicts require more individual
management via either recusal and restraint or other forms of conflict
management.
111. The hearing processes on Judge Robert Bork (who was not confirmed) and Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas (who was confirmed) were two of the most heated battles grounded
in ideology of the two judges. See generally ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA
(1999); ANDREW PEYrON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS, A BIOG.APH" (2001), for more
information.
112. Even now, one can see the potential relevance of this management tool for the
conflicts confronting Supreme CourtJustices. This Article will later examine balancing as it
applies to the Supreme Court. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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A final means for managing a conflict of interest is disclosure,
which is usually minimally required for disqualification, divestiture,
and balancing. The purpose of disclosure can be to alter the parties
(for possible challenges and resulting changes of judges in lower
courts), explain recusal, or head off charges of bias through advance
disclosure. In those cases in which recusal is not possible, disclosure
may be the means by which the public interest is served via close pub-
lic supervision instigated by the disclosure of the conflict. In this case,
disclosure, as a conflicts management tool, may be an apt and exclu-
sive means of addressing conflicts of interest. Insofar as the disclosure
comprehensively sets out a conflict of interest, it alerts those af-
fected-principals in the case of business decision-making and the
public in the case of a public servant-that the agent admits the exis-
tence of potential conflict of interest. Such disclosure would typically
include some affirmation by the agent that her conduct will conform
to that required by her principal, whatever the rules may be, and a
periodic accounting-i.e. continuous disclosure-updating actions
within the purview of the potential conflict."l 3
IV. Judicial Conflicts of Interest
With two important exceptions, judicial conflicts of interest mir-
ror those in other settings, but the two exceptions, insofar as they may
be atypical in cases involving corporate agents, are significant. While
judges are responsible for reporting, managing, and disqualifying
themselves, as in cases of financial and familial conflicts of interest,
they must also deal with and respond to potential ideological conflicts,
as in the case ofJustices Scalia and Ginsburg.1 14 That judges must also
answer to a remarkably more amorphous principal, the public, also
113. See STARK, supra note 77, at 250. Andrew Stark states that disclosure "both attenu-
ates and exaggerates the prophylactic nature of conflict-of-interest regulation." Id. at 251.
It allows the principal, or, in the case ofjudicial conflicts of interest, the public, to judge
whether the conflict exists, and to what extent the agent confronted with the conflict man-
ages it well or at all. Id. at 252-53.
114. A recusal motion was denied in a case in which the trial judge disclosed to the
parties that a key government witness was the son of his deceased godparents. United
States v. Cole, 293 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950 (2002). The judge had
not had any contact with the witness for more than ten years and had last seen him when
he happened to walk into a courtroom in which the witness was being sentenced. Id. The
judge also stated that he had reviewed the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT for United States
Judges and governing statutes and that he could be fair and impartial in presiding over
trial and issuing various rulings. Id. The court ruled that the judge was not biased simply
because he knew the witness. Id. So, the judge was right not to recuse himself, but the
public revelation of his lack of follow-up with friends and family had to be embarrassing
[cold and unfeeling maybe, but not biased].
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deviates from some of the conventional wisdom surrounding agency
theory as it relates to conflicts of interest. Public interest requires not
only that judges act impartially, but that they also appear to act impar-
tially, a rather amorphous but important institutional concern. The
following subsections trace the general conflict of interest rules associ-
ated with judging and focus on the two exceptions, ideological con-
flicts and the public as principal.
A. Judicial Disqualification Rules
Assuming a federal judge has not divested himself of potential
financial conflicts of interest, he must disqualify himself if he "has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding," 115 "served
as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,"' 16 served in a government
capacity "concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion con-
cerning the merits of the particular case,"' 1 7 "has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy,"' 18 a spouse or relative is a party,
officer, director trustee, lawyer or has an interest in the litigation that
could "be substantially affected by the outcome." 1 9 As important, and
clearly relevant in Justice Scalia's duck hunting case, is the overarch-
ing statutory prescription for disqualification, which states that ajudge
should disqualify "himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."120
These disqualification rules have a removal role; they seek to
eliminate from the adjudication process those judges who have subjec-
tive knowledge or some inclination that prevents impartiality, a finan-
cial stake in a case's outcome, or some other objective basis for
recusal. Although one might surmise that judges can easily recognize
cases provoking financial conflicts of interest, this is not always so. As
evidence of this, several federal judges exhibited various levels of in-
credulity when they discovered, after the fact, that they were share-
holders in companies named as parties to litigation before them.1 2 1
115. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2000).
116. Id. § 455(b) (2). The statute would also require disqualification if the judge was
associated with the lawyer currently before the court. Id.
117. Id. §455(b)(3).
118. Id. § 455(b) (4). The statute extends the financial stake to the judge's spouse and
minor child. Id.
119. Id. § 455(b) (5).
120. Id. § 455(a).
121. Charles Bierbauer, Eight Federal Judges Had Conflict of Interest, CNN.coM, Sept. 13,
1999, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/09/13/judges.conflict/.
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Neither does prior involvement as an attorney insure judicial disquali-
fication, if the judge happens to be on the Supreme Court. During his
nomination hearings for elevation to Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist
was the object of derision because of his failure as Associate Justice to
recuse himself in a case in which he had previously served as head of
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Council.1 22
There are also the specific ideological conflicts, or those cases in
which the personal views of a judge have been stated publicly in ad-
vance of the case. 123 Ajudge's general opinion about a legal or social
matter relating to a pending case does not automatically render a
judge biased or prejudiced within the meaning of the judicial ca-
nons. 24 However, a judge who declares in court to the prosecutor
that he himself would have charged the defendant with a felony and
not a misdemeanor has created the appearance of a conflict. 125 Still,
that perception problem rears its vocal head, and self-recusal becomes
necessary in those cases in which impartiality is compromised or ap-
pears to be so by the sheer emotion of the judge's views. 126 Justice
Scalia, for example, acting on an apparent bias revealed by public
statements he made while the case was pending, recused himself from
the "Pledge of Allegiance" case. 127
122. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 589,
592-95 (1987) (documenting Rehnquist's involvement in the case of Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972), both as an administrator and then as Associate Justice).
123. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (regarding Justice Scalia's recusal for
views on the "Pledge of Allegiance").
124. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) (2000). See, e.g., Cleveland Bar
Ass'n v. Cleary, 754 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 2001).
125. It is unclear which way the conflict goes. The statement could indicate the judge is
irritated with the prosecutor and unlikely to give him a fair shot at the trial, or the state-
ment could indicate that the judge thinks the defendant is guilty as sin and clearly headed
for the maximum penalty the misdemeanor provides. This is an unusual case in that a
conflict exists on both sides, and the appellate court agreed that the judge needed to go,
allowing the parties to fill in whatever conflict they saw for the conflict was in this case, in
the eye of the beholder. Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 760 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 2002);
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 3B(2), 3B(7), 3E(1) (a) (2000); MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIY DR 1-102(A) (5) (2000).
126. There are also cases in which the views affect not only the outcome, but also the
plea bargain. For example, ajudge who was a vocal opponent of probation offered a defen-
dant a lesser sentence if she would agree to have her baby and put it up for adoption as
opposed to having an abortion and a longer prison term. See Cleary, 754 N.E.2d at 240;
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) (2000).
127. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2004). While the case
was on appeal, Justice Scalia made public statements that he believed the pledge was con-
stitutional as written. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on 'Under God' in
Pledge to Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at Al (noting the potential for a four-to-four vote
in the case, given Scalia's position).
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Currently, some question both Justices Scalia and Ginsburg for
their involvement in, respectively, the case involving Vice President
Cheney 28 and Justice Ginsburg's willingness to lend her name for a
lectureship sponsored by NOW.129 Granted, both of these cases raise
issues of conflict of interest, but only the subjective judgments of Jus-
tices Scalia and Ginsburg can decide whether these apparent conflicts
affect their impartiality.1 30 Neither of these conflicts originates from
pecuniary or familial sources. This lack of direct conflict distinguishes
these cases from those typically confronting private concerns. While
private agency problems can arise in cases like these, judicial conflicts
of interest often do. These subjective, non-slam-dunk types of conflicts
require judicial interpretation, restraint, and sensitivity to the percep-
tion of impartiality.
B. Self-Recusal in Close-Call Conflicts
For subjective disqualifications, a judge, charged with the sacred
obligation of impartiality, must decide that the case, parties, or cir-
cumstances surrounding the litigation create a conflict that only dis-
qualification overcomes. As noted earlier, when there is no codified
standard, we rely on the judicial temperament. For example, a judge
who is related to neither a party, nor an attorney presenting a case
may disqualify herself if prior dealings with one of the attorneys has
unalterably biased her against that attorney.13'
More problematic, but no less a potential source of a conflict, are
those instances in which there may be a strong objective basis for
questioning the impartiality of a sitting judge. For example, a judge
need not be disqualified from trying the murder case of a defendant
who shot and killed the chief of police because the judge attended the
chief's memorial service.1 3 2 He must disqualify himself, however, if he
serves on the board of an organization involved in a memorial fund
128. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
130. There are lower court cases in which the friendship between ajudge and a lawyer
in the case are deemed not to be per se conflicts but conflicts to be self-policed by the
parties involved. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985). For exam-
ple, a relationship from the past will probably not affect the ability of the judge to hear the
case. Sofford v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Colo. 1997), summary judg-
ment granted, 954 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo. 1997).
131. Ajudge who had referred a case to a lawyer appearing before him some fifteen
years earlier need not recuse himself from the case, even though is was a heck of a referral,
famous enough for everyone to remember! Sofford, 954 F. Supp. at 1457-1458, summary
judgment granted, 954 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Colo. 1997).
132. State v. Browning, 224 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1967).
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for the chief.133 Reliance onjudicial temperament can prove problem-
atic, as the two present circumstances indicate. The issue of the con-
flict did not occur to either Justice until third parties intervened.
Duck hunting trips with old friends and political allies and name-
loaning to decidedly political and like-thinking organizations are
other examples. In such cases, one may surmise that some fair means
of evaluating the potential conflict and determining the appropriate
response would exist. For the Supreme Court, the method of review
and disposition of conflicts of interest is decidedly subjective, notwith-
standing the federal disqualification statute. Each Supreme CourtJus-
tice has the authority to unilaterally determine whether
disqualification is appropriate for a given case13 4
Further, these unilateral declarations and decisions regarding
conflicts are made in an era when standards for conflicts of interest
have eroded slowly but certainly. Conflicts remain conflicts, but our
tolerance for conflicts has increased as conflicted parties' righteous
indignation has found us accepting their solemn avowals that their
conflicts could not possibly influence them. 13 5 Tolerance for conflicts
has desensitized all of us, including the judiciary, to the need for vigi-
lance in both recusal and management of conflicts. The extensive re-
133. Id. at 398.
134. See supra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
135. For example, commentator and columnist Maggie Gallagher indicated that she
did not see the conflict and that even if there was a conflict, she forgot about being paid
the $21,500. Kurtz, supra note 88, at CO. Auditors and their professional organizations
long resisted regulation of the conflicting roles of auditor and consultant on the grounds
that the consulting was not something that would influence their audit work. Analysts
maintained that soft dollar payments from companies for their research as well as incentive
systems for pay from their investment banker employers did not taint their independence
or reports. Audit and compensation committee members of boards insisted that they were
independent for purposes of their roles there despite consulting, employment, and other
arrangements with these companies on whose boards they say. Federal legislation now con-
trols all of these areas and eliminates the conflicts because the practices clearly required
something more than disclosure or other management tools. See Sarbanes-Oxley discus-
sion, supra notes 102-103. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-6 (West 2003), for the specific section on
analysts. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants Home Page, http://www.aicpa.org,
for specifics on auditor independence, which, prior to Sarbanes-Oxley defined indepen-
dence of auditors on the basis of a financial interest of the auditor or his/her family in the
audit client and did not address the conflicts of interest now defined under Sarbanes-
Oxley. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (g) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). Prior to post-Enron reforms,
audit and compensation committee members of boards often held consulting contracts
with the company in a financial conflict of interest that was widely practiced and accepted.
The New York Stock Exchange adopted rules in 2004 to curb the conflicts of interest re-
vealed in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, and other scandals. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
NYSE DIRECTORS' CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS (2004), available at http://nyse.
com/pdfs/codeofethics.pdf.
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forms in journalism standards and corporate governance over the past
three years demonstrate that in those fields the tolerance for conflicts
had increased to the point at which regulation defining conflicts and
independence became necessary. When an amoral atmosphere re-
garding conflicts of interest has permeated such major parts of the
culture, it is perhaps necessary for all fields, including the judiciary, to
revisit the notion of conflicts, to revisit the purpose of the ethical stan-
dard on conflicts, and to regroup in terms of defining and managing
conflicts. The final sections provide the backdrop for the retooling on
judicial conflicts.
C. Overarching Principles for Judicial Conflicts of Interest
Justice may not be blind, but it must be impartial. In a judicial
setting, conflicts of interest pose impartiality problems for judges, at-
torneys, parties to the lawsuit, and the public. No matter its source,
subjective or objective, originating from internal or external sources,
pecuniary or not, judicial bias cannot stand. Judicial disqualification
laws apply not only to conflicts of economic or familial interests, but
also those conflicts arising from subjective bias. As important, though,
are cases of objective bias where ajudge's "impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned. '136 The classic conflicts include those in which the
judge is related to the parties, and recusal is mandatory.13 7
Nevertheless, there are those affiliated relative cases in which the
relative is not a party to the case, but has a tangential relationship to
one of the parties. For example, despite objections raised during the
contentious Bush v. Gore case, Justice Thomas did not recuse himself
when the press pointed out that his wife, Virginia Lamp Thomas,
worked for the Heritage Foundation, a think-tank that was in the pro-
136. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
137. Even a relation to a party once removed was grounds for Justice Clarence
Thomas's recusal in the Virginia Military Institute case. Because his son was a student
there, Justice Thomas recused himself from that decision. United States v. Va. Military
Inst.. 508 U.S. 946 (1993). But in Buntingv. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004), Justice Thomas
did not recuse himself from the petition for writ of certiorari in a case involving supper
prayer at VMI because his son had graduated. Alumni status is not deemed to create impar-
tiality. Easley v. Univ. of Mich., 906 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc 906 F.2d
1143 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1990); Brody v. Harvard Coll., 664 F.2d 10,
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982). Service on the board of trustees of an
alma mater is grounds for recusal when the alma mater has a financial stake in the out-
come of the case. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). In this
case, the district judge served on the board of trustees for Loyola University, which had a
financial stake in the determinations in the case regarding rights to real property, and the
judge had participated in board discussions about the property rights and the potential
litigation. Id.
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cess of reviewing resumes and making recommendations for appoint-
ments to the Bush administration. Nor did Justice Scalia recuse
himself in that same case because his son was a partner at Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, and Theodore Olson, also a partner there, argued
the Bush side of the case before the Court and eventually became
Solicitor General of the United States by the Bush Administration. 13 8
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, like their colleagues on the Su-
preme Court, must each address the issue of conflict of interest with a
view toward eliminating actual or apparent bias. Two questions follow.
Are both Justices correct not to disqualify themselves in the cases
presented? The problem in answering this question in Justice Scalia's
case is that any objective appraisal of his decision depends of the ac-
quisition and interpretation of somewhat unavailable or uncertain
facts. Although those provided by the media are incomplete and occa-
sionally wrong, 139 the "duck" rule still suggests that Justice Scalia's ac-
tivities were at least unwise and provoke an objective stigma.
Conversely, if we accept the facts provided by Justice Scalia-and,
given the dispositive nature of his view, we are often confined to those
provided by the Justice-then perhaps he was capable of being impar-
tial in the Cheney case. 1 40
Yet the presence of the classic rationalizations advanced in con-
flicts situations and other types of ethical dilemmas suggest that Jus-
tice Scalia did not see the issue from a candid analysis of his
impartiality but rather from the defensive mode of justification of his
conduct to the public via an opinion intended for media consumption
and reporting. Indeed, the closing lines of the opinion make clear,
along with his chastisement about incorrect facts, that Justice Scalia
could not have been objective about the motion to recuse because of
the personal pain the media hoopla apparently brought. 141
138. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
139. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (documenting claims of inaccurate ac-
counts of Scalia's duck hunting trip).
140. There have been decisions on close friendship cases in which courts have noted
that there comes a point at which the friendship is so close that it becomes impossible for
the judge to remain aloof given the relationship of the parties. See, e.g., United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1982); see also United
States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (lth Cir. 1989).
141. The closing lines of the recusal opinion were:
As the newspaper editorials appended to the motion make clear, I have received a
good deal of embarrassing criticism and adverse publicity in connection with the
matters at issue here-even to the point of becoming (as the motion cruelly but
accurately states) "fodder for late-night comedians." Motion to Recuse 6. If I
could have done so in good conscience, I would have been pleased to demon-
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Further, Justice Scalia's description of the issue recognizes the ju-
dicial conflicts standard, but assures that such is not the issue in the
case:
There are, I am sure, those who believe that my friendship with
persons in the current administration might cause me to favor the
Government in cases brought against it. That is not the issue here.
Nor is the issue whether personal friendship with the Vice Presi-
dent might cause me to favor the Government in cases in which he
is named. None of those suspicions regarding my impartiality (er-
roneous suspicions, I hasten to protest) bears upon recusal here.
The question, simply put, is whether someone who thought I could
decide this case impartially despite my friendship with the Vice
President would reasonably believe that I cannot decide it impar-
tially because I went hunting with that friend and accepted an invi-
tation to fly there with him on a Government plane. 142
Justice Ginsburg's situation may be more problematic because
the issue of affiliation with a party to the case has already been ad-
dressed by the lower courts with a different result than the non-
recusal reached by the good Justice. In In re Aguinda,143 a federal
court of appeals dealt with the issue of impartiality in a case in which a
judge had attended a legal seminar that was sponsored by one of the
parties to litigation. 144 The judge in the case had attended a seminar
in which his expenses were paid at an institute that received funding
from one of the parties in the case. 145 The court held that such at-
tendance and related sponsorship did not require recusal unless the
following special circumstances applied: (1) a presentation does not
relate to legal issues material to the disposition of a claim or defense
in action before ajudge who attended the presentation, (2) the fund-
ing by a party of a seminar's sponsor is too remote or minor to appear
to a reasonable person to have an influence on the judge, and (3) the
strate my integrity, and immediately silence the criticism, by getting off the case.
Since I believe there is no basis for recusal, I cannot.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 929 (2004) (mem.). Living in denial has been a
pattern across professions and groups when it comes to conflicts of interest. See id. at 926.
142. Id. at 928.
143. 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
144. Id.
145. The institute was the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environ-
ment ("FREE"), and one of its corporate sponsors was Texaco, a party to a case involving
the Sierra Club who had brought the motion for recusal. Brief of Respondent Sierra Club,
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475), available at 2004 WL 522599;
Reply Brief for the Petitioners (Appellate Petition), Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S.
367 (2004) (No. 03-475), available at 2003 WL 22720970.
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nature of a party's funding of a sponsoring organization does not cre-
ate an appearance of either control or impropriety. 46
The topics for the Ruth Bader Ginsburg lecture series are wo-
men's rights, gender equality, and related legal issues. Indeed, when
Justice Ginsburg was the speaker she spoke of her history of fighting
for gender equality. NOW, the sponsor of the event, was a party to the
case, albeit an amicus. While her expenses were paid by a co-sponsor,
the New York State Bar, the funding for the series itself comes from
NOW. Further, Justice Ginsburg is not a mere attendee at a sympo-
sium or lecture. 147 The lecture series is named for her, an honor and
recognition bestowed on ajustice who will decide cases in which it has
taken a position. Ex ante those decisions were favorable to NOW, with
Justice Ginsburg's support. The appearance existed, at least to those
outside the Court, as the earlier discussion of the situation
outlined. 148
V. The Recusal Process: Practice, Issues, and Reforms
The second question in judicial conflicts is at least as important as
the first. Is the system of unilateral review by Supreme Court Justices
the most appropriate method of addressing judicial conflicts of inter-
est? Even if Scalia's and Ginsburg's decisions were incorrect, it may
not be fair to attribute them to some systemic method of decision-
making in such cases.
This section briefly examines the two most important features of
an effective judicial conflict of interest policy: transparency and a de-
fensible process of review. This Article notes that the conflicts among
Supreme Court Justices tend to be transparent, but that unilateral re-
view and disposition by the Justices is lacking. It nonetheless argues
that, notwithstanding popular 149 and scholarly positions' 50 to the con-
trary, singular review and decision-making is the only defensible
means available in such cases. Before examining transparency and
process, this Article notes the peculiar manner in which agency, the
146. See Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 194.
147. There is an older case that held that a mere lecture by a judge at a law school did
not require recusal in a case involving the dean of the law school. MacNeil Bros. Co. v.
Cohen, 264 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1959). However, the date of the case is problematic because
of so many statutory and other changes in codes regarding conflicts of interest.
148. See Hagan v. Coggins, 77 F. Supp. 2d 776 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that recusal
was warranted when outside perception was that it was necessary).
149. See supa notes 40-73 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 122.
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relationship giving rise to such conflicts, applies to public officials
such as judges.
A. An Agency View of the Federal Judiciary
If conflicts of interest are inherent in agency problems, then
agency theory must have some descriptive appeal in judicial conflicts
of interest. The theory does apply, but there are risks associated with
attempting to find congruency between conflicts of interest in private
versus public environments. The conflicts facing public officials, in-
cluding judges, are often not as concrete as those facing, for example,
corporate officers, and the responses to public conflicts of interest are
often not as well conceived or applied.
These differences arise, at least in part, because of a very pro-
nounced difference in the principals associated with private as op-
posed to public agency problems. Private principals, and the interests
they hope to protect and enhance, tend to be well-defined. Judges
exist to further the public interest, and it is the public and its amor-
phous and diverse interests that guide the actions of all public ser-
vants, including judges. The public interest, "the needs and welfare of
the general body of citizens," 151 is remarkably complex. While the pro-
tected interests of private principals tend to be pecuniary and measur-
able, those furthering the public interest, the principal of the
judiciary, are often the object of debate, remarkably less pecuniary
and therefore decidedly hard to measure.
This difficulty in assessment is especially so in cases in which
neither financial nor familial conflicts apply, such as cases of ideologi-
cal conflicts of interest. In such cases, objective views about the exis-
tence of a conflict and judicial impartiality are subsumed by a political
reality in which roughly half of the polity will likely agree with the
judge's decision, while the other half, as in the cases of Justices Scalia
and Ginsburg, downplays the conflict and claims of partiality.
B. The Need for Transparency
While the definition of public interest is somewhat fleeting, the
public interest in a democracy demands transparency. 152 Autonomous
voters have the right to the information necessary to make reasoned
choices about the direction of the republic. These are among John
151. Classics of Administrative ethics 118 (Willa Bruce ed., 2001).
152. SeeJOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 293-94, 341-45, 348, 369 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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Locke's principles of equality.15 3 Applied to the judiciary, trans-
parency means that the public has a right to know about actual and
potential conflicts of interest facing ajudge. Toward this end, the judi-
cial nomination process often serves to recognize and manage poten-
tial conflicts. Federal judges routinely acknowledge and address
potential conflicts during nomination and review. 154 That the nomi-
nation system also invites questions and answers involving potential
ideological conflicts of interest has complicated the process because
judicial ideology invariably precedes the nomination, but creates dif-
ferent issues in a conflict of interest analysis. 155
We also rely heavily on the press, the political process, and the
judge herself in identifying conflicts of interest. The system works only
if the public knows about an actual or apparent conflict and its means
of resolution. Judging by his apparent disdain for having to tackle the
recusal issue in the Cheney case, Justice Scalia may have chosen to be
reticent about his duck hunting trip and its relationship to that
case. 156 The good news, however, is that the legal, political, and news
environments operated to expose the potential conflict and necessi-
tate a response. Whether Scalia's response and choice not to recuse
himself were sufficient to mute the criticism is distinct from the desira-
ble result of exposure and response. In fact, it is rare in our polity that
the public is satisfied that the information on which decisions are
made is complete and truthful. Transparency as an ideal may demand
this, but our democracy seems more than capable of surviving on suffi-
cient, as opposed to full, information.
153. Id.
154. This, of course, is part of the problem because the nomination process for the
Supreme Court centers on ideology, the most contentious political issue. One author sug-
gests that ideology is an essential part of the appointment process, but differentiates ideol-
ogy from agenda-the latter emphasizing furthering ideology rather than deciding cases.
See Steven H. Goldberg, Putting the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology, Yes, Agenda, No, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 192 (2004).
155. See id. (providing guidelines for Senate questioning of Supreme Court nominees
that elevate ideology over agenda). This significance of ideology as a source of judicial
conflict of interest is developed more thoroughly infra notes 164-178 and accompanying
text.
156. There is nothing in his memorandum responding to the motion to recuse that
remotely suggests that Justice Scalia would have raised the issue of conflict of interest,
except for the recusal motion. On the contrary, the memo constantly emphasizes his
friendship with Vice President Cheney, the unwritten rule that matters before the Court
are inappropriate sources of their conversations, and Scalia's categorical ability to be im-
partial in the case. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem.).
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C. A Defensible Process for Reviewing Judicial Conflicts
The procedure by which Supreme Court Justices respond to con-
flicts of interest, whether self-perceived or brought upon them by the
media, is as important as the exposure of conflicts of interest. The
system works only if direct stakeholders in the judicial process-par-
ties to litigation, their attorneys, and fellow judges-see it work and
embrace, if not always agree with, its conclusions. Just as important is
that all others, including indirect stakeholders, such as the other Jus-
tices, the other branches of the government, and members of the re-
public, must have sufficient confidence in the system to support its
conclusions.
Viewed in this manner, the unilateral review system settles the
issue, but often at the expense of the objective view of the Court. It is
ad hoc, uneven and less-than-inspirational to those affected. Once
again, the Scalia case is an example. His memorandum was essentially
the only accepted method of responding to claims of conflict of inter-
est and is likely most notable for exhibiting incredulity at the claim
that he should disqualify himself rather than remorse that his duck
hunting foray inspired claims of conflict. As bad, if not worse, Justice
Ginsburg's response in a speech at a law school was informal and of-
fered only after decisions had been rendered in the cases in which the
party with whom she had the conflict had participated. The final prod-
uct of these claims and counterclaims is somewhat unclear, but the
combined effects of calls for recusal and Scalia's and Ginsburg's re-
sponses have quieted the debate, but left unsettled questions about
whether the current system requires change. 157
D. Support for Unilateral Review
There are two important reasons to support the current method
of resolving conflicts of interest confronting Supreme Court Justices.
These are the bobtailing effect of judicial recusal by the Justices and
the slippery slope of indirect conflicts, most particularly those arising
because of ideology. Although both have previously been mentioned,
they require additional development.
157. Chief Justice Rehnquist has not been particularly reassuring. When interviewed
about the Scalia and Ginsburg hoopla and asked about whether he would recuse himself if
a case involved one of his fellow players in his regular poker games, theJustice responded,
"No. If it were a regular game ... and the only occasion on which I saw the person was at
the monthly game, no, I don't think I'd recuse myself." Ties, supra note 4, at A20.
JUDICIAL CONFLICTS OF INTERESTSummer 2005]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
1. The Bobtailing Effect
A bobtailed Court can be a problem. While Justice recusal is not
uncommon, 158 members of the Supreme Court have categorically em-
braced a presumption against recusal because of the problems arising
from disqualification. 15 9 In defense of their decisions not to recuse
themselves, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg defended this presumption
by citing the problems arising from an eight member court, including
Scalia's assertion: "the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it [the
Court] will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue
presented by the case.' 160
In fact, there have been interesting doctrinal turns occasioned by
a bobtailed Supreme Court. An example would include the Court's
struggle during the 1970s to set out a principled doctrine applying
procedural due process requirements to creditor-debtor relations.
The case of Fuentes v. Shevin,' 6 ' holding unconstitutional the majority
of the states' collateral repossession laws for their failure to provide
debtors pre-repossession hearings, 162 has, for example, been criticized
as the product of a four-to-three decision. a63 Unlike athletic teams or
even the federal Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court has a constitu-
tionally finite membership reduced for any case by the number of ju-
dicial vacancies, including those arising from recusal.
158. See Stempel, supra note 122, at 608-28 (tracing the rather checkered recusal his-
tory of Supreme Court Justices).
159. The Court's Judicial Recusal Policy states:
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond the requirements
of the [disqualification] statute, and to recuse ourselves, out of an excess of cau-
tion, whenever a relative is a partner in a firm before us or acted as a lawyer at an
earlier stage. Even one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court.
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915-16.
160. Id. at 916-17. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (documentingJustice Gins-
burg's use of the bobtailing effect in her decision not to recuse herself in NOW cases).
161. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
162. Id. at 97.
We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work
a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right
to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor.
Our holding, however, is a narrow one. We do not question the power of a State
to seize goods before a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of
creditors so long as those creditors have tested their claim to the goods through
the process of a fair prior hearing.
Id,
163. N. Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem., 419 U.S. 601, 615 (1975) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
Blackmun's assertion was that cases subsequent to Fuentes had restricted its application.
When the Fuentes decision reappeared in North Georgia Finishing, Blackmun expressed sur-
prise that Fuentes, a 4-3 "bobtailed" decision had apparently been resurrected. Id.
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2. Ideological Conflicts
Ideology can pose even more complicated problems, especially if
one defines mostjudicial conflicts of interest as ideological. It is, after
all, ideology that accompanies the Justice's appointment and colors
his decisions. As Justice Rehnquist notes, "[p]roof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of quali-
fication, not lack of bias."' 164 Stated differently, we assume thatjudicial
nominees must exhibit a certain level of scholarship in constitutional
theory, but this doctrinal ideology also signals ajudicial predisposition
in most cases. Assuming ideology so influences ajudge's position that
she cannot provide the parties a fair hearing, the conflict between her
ideology and ability to judge is unalterable and sufficient grounds for
disqualification. 165 If the polity disdains conflicts of interest that de-
tract from a judge's ability fairly to evaluate a case, then it simply can-
not tolerate ideological conflicts.
Nevertheless, we do seem to tolerate ideological conflicts of inter-
est, at least apparent ones. Justices Scalia's and Ginsburg's conflicts
implicate neither financial interest in nor familial relationship with a
party before the Court, but are nonetheless contentious. Scalia's claim
that he received no gift from Cheney, based largely on the premise
that the plane that flew Scalia, his son, and son-in-law to Louisiana was
going that way with or without the Justice, 166 may be correct-at least
technically-but does not diminish the perception that the favor and
fellowship opportunities reinforce a long-term ideological partnership
between the Justice and Vice President. Even if, as Scalia insists, the
two never discussed the case, the public may reasonably wonder
whether the Justice's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."167
And Ginsburg's continuing relationship with NOW provokes a similar
appearance.1 68 By retaining that relationship, Justice Ginsburg com-
164. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.).
165. However, experts consulted at the time of the Ginsburg/Scalia debate were con-
cerned about debate as well as conflicts: New York University law professor Stephen Gillers,
an expert on legal ethics summarized his views as follows, "This is ajudgment call. We have
to be careful here. Some might say judges should lead monastic lives, but I don't believe
that. I think judges and [J]ustices should participate in broad legal debates, but within
restraints." Ties, supra note 4, at A20.
166. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004) (mem.).
167. More precisely, the public may wonder whether the Justice can unilaterally
fathom whether or to what extent there are objective grounds to question his or her impar-
tiality, consistent with the disqualification statute. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
168. Geoffrey C. Hazard, a University of Pennsylvania law professor and author of a
treatise on legal ethics said thatJustice Ginsburg's activity crossed a line between ideology
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promises her objective ability to fairly evaluate a case in which the
organization happens to be a party.
Ideology can pose genuine conflicts of interest, but also defies
traditional methods of responding to such conflicts. David Luban
identifies three unsatisfactory reasons and one more plausible expla-
nation for not folding ideology into our treatment of conflicts of inter-
est.169 First, one may argue that blood (familial ties) and money
(financial stakes) are thicker than ideology. 170 If this were so, argues
Luban, then the Crusades would not have happened. 71
Second, people may want or at least tolerate political (ideologi-
cal) judging. 172 This tolerance may be accurate in those cases in which
the political judging squares with the politics of the observer; however,
there exists no evidence that the American public is willing to tolerate
a general infusion of politics into the judging business. 173
Third, ideological predisposition is relatively innocuous unless
the judge also has "a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party."174 Luban asserts that ideology can pose conflicts, notwithstand-
ing the parties, if the judge is predisposed against "product liability
plaintiffs" or "affirmative action opponents." 175
Finally, Luban suggests that we simply have not been able to fash-
ion conflicts of interest rules for ideological conflicts. 176 Of these ex-
planations, he views this one as most convincing. 177 Indeed, ideology
tends to defy the objective categorization associated with conflicts of
interest rules. The presumption is that a judge's own subjective deci-
sion whether to recuse herself in a case for other than financial or
familial reasons is, except for the extreme constitutional measures
and affiliation with a group whose sole purpose is litigation before the United States Su-
preme Court, "'It is not illegal, but as a matter ofjudgment I would say appearing before
the NOW legal defense fund is inappropriate.... It is a demonstration of an affiliation.'"
Ties, supra note 4, at A20 (quoting Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard).
169. See David Luban, Law's Blindfold, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 23,
29, (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001).
170. Id. at 29.
171. See id. ("The greatest blood-lettings in human history have been motivated by
politics and religion, not family or finance.").
172. Id.
173. See id. If the polity were tolerant of "political"judges, Luban states, then we would
not see the "chronic criticism ofjudges imposing their own convictions instead of following
the law." Id.
174. Id (quoting the CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 30.
177. See id.
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such as impeachment,17 8 the only appropriate means of responding to
ideological conflicts. Yet some argue there is a better way of handling
claims of bias and disqualification for the brethren. The next section
summarizes and counters those arguments.
E. Suggested Reforms and Their Shortcomings
Calls for reform of the Supreme Court by persons or institutions
external to the Court are rare. Franklin Roosevelt's effort to increase
by four the number of Supreme Court Justices was neither well re-
ceived nor practicable, largely because of the Court's constitutional
status and Congress's traditional unwillingness to tinker with the num-
ber of Supreme Court Justices.179 As an autonomous branch of gov-
ernment, the Court has no internally objective method of fleshing out
and responding to conflicts of interest. Whereas a panel of court of
appeals judges can review disqualification request of their brethren,
without the potential for bobtailing, i80 the Supreme Court cannot be
the object of any exogenous review procedure that varies from their
status as a branch of government. Absent a constitutional amend-
ment, neither Congress nor the President may pursue information
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (United States Supreme CourtJustices "shall hold their
offices during good behavior.. . ."). Impeachment is the only recognized manner of re-
moving a reluctant judge from that position.
179. Congress does have the power to alter that number. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Upset
by Supreme Court decisions against his New Deal reforms, President Roosevelt, in 1937,
submitted to Congress a plan to allow him to appoint additional Justices, ostensibly to pack
the Court with New Deal supporters. In one of his fireside chats, President Roosevelt de-
fended this idea:
If by that phrase "packing the Court" it is charged that I wish to place on the
bench spineless puppets who would disregard the law and would decide specific
cases as I wished them to be decided, I make this answer: that no President fit for
his office would appoint, and no Senate of honorable men fit for their office
would confirm, that kind of appointees to the Supreme Court.
But if by that phrase the charge is made that I would appoint and the Senate
would confirm Justices worthy to sit beside present members of the Court, who
understand modern conditions, that I will appointJustices who will not undertake
to override the judgment of the Congress on legislative policy, that I will appoint
Justices who will act as Justices and not as legislators-if the appointment of such
Justices can be called "packing the Courts," then I say that I and with me the vast
majority of the American people favor doing just that thing-now.
Audio recording: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary
(Mar. 9, 1937), available at http://www.hpol.org/fdr/chat.ram (last visited May 31, 2005).
180. The federal circuit courts of appeal hear cases typically in panels of three judges.
The total number of eligible judges in each circuit varies, but no circuit includes fewer
than six judges. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44-46 (2000).
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about, report, or manage the Supreme Court's conflicts of interest,
except within constitutionally mandated impeachment procedures.' 8 '
The only remaining method of objective review of such conflicts
is internal within the Court. Jeffrey Stempel suggests a full review by
the assembled Court of any recusal motion in which the individual
Justice refuses self-recusal.1 8 2 He argues that a majority of the remain-
ingJustices must sustain their colleague's decision for it to be final.18 3
This bench approval would promote a more rigorous examination of
disqualification cases in line with the applicable statute.
As appealing as this procedure may seem, it has obvious draw-
backs. First, there is reason to believe that the reviewing decision by
the remaining Justices will not dispose of the matter. If a single judge
is the object of the recusal motion, then it may be difficult to eke out a
majority of the remaining eightJustices. Requiring five of the remain-
ing eight Justices to agree with their brethren appears to shift the pre-
sumption against recusal to one favoring disqualification. This is not
only antithetical to the presumptive impartiality we attribute to all
judges, but also disproportionately favors those seeking recusal
whether their reasons are justified or strategic. Those who may benefit
by the recusal of a potentially unsupportive Justice will enjoy an advan-
tage they previously did not have.
Such a full-Court review also seems fraught with collective action
problems. Justices who are inclined to assert impartiality, especially in
close cases, such as those confronting Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
must now contend with their brethren who tend to espouse similar
sentiments. In such cases, the group norm would likely be to support
one's colleague-i.e. cooperate. 8 4 Failure to do so-for example, vot-
ing to recuse a Justice who contests disqualification-is tantamount to
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1, Congress can increase the number
of Justices from which a panel of seven to nine sit for a given case, but there is little reason
to believe this will ever happen.
182. Stempel, supra note 122, at 644.
183. Id.
184. A collective action problem, stated generally, pits individual against collective
maximization, assuming rational decision making. Typified by the prisoners' dilemma, in-
dividual maximization produces collective minimization, whereas some level of individual
sacrifice produces societal maximization. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984). There is strong evidence that cooperative norms presently influence
judicial recusal decisions by Supreme Court Justices. As Justice Scalia stated in his memo-
randum opinion in the Cheney case, the presumption disfavors recusal. Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916-17 (2004) (mem.). By their own admission, Supreme CourtJus-
tices also routinely discuss recusal possibilities among themselves, suggesting both a level of
cooperation consistent with collective action cases and potentially negative consequences
arising from internal disputes associated with recusal. See Sherrilyn A. fill, Litigating the
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a defection, the consequences of which, given the vagaries of game
theory, are certainly not discrete to that case. t1s 5 Assuming only four of
eight Justices side with their colleague who contests recusal, then,
given Stempel's prescription, that Justice must recuse himself. One
can easily imagine that motions for recusal coupled with this method
of internal review could create the single most contentious issues for
the Court. Good faith among the brethren may give way to tit-for-tat
gamesmanship.18 6 Parties may also be more inclined to seek judicial
recusal, given this method of internal review, further transforming the
internal operations of the Court by politicizing the recusal process.
The alternatives to the current method of responding to recusal
motions before the Supreme Court are limited and potentially worse
than retention of the status quo. In fact, leaving the decision about
whether to respond to ostensible conflicts of interest to the individual
Justice, including Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, is preferable to and
more practicable than alternatives. The next section revisits the cases
of Scalia and Ginsburg in light of this premise.
F. Retaining Individual Review
The Supreme Court has the capacity to rise above internal
problems such as those confronting Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, both
facing calls for recusal based on their friendships or close affiliations
with actual or potential litigants before the courts. Supporting the
well-established method of dealing with calls for disqualification is not
the same as embracing the decisions by individual Justices. Nor does it
diminish the potential for further problems arising from claims of
conflict of interest.
Indeed, Justice Scalia had to have known that an appearance of
conflict of interest would arise from, and that he was at least injudi-
cious for accepting a plane ride to, his Louisiana duck hunting foray
with Vice President Cheney. The tone of his response refusing disqual-
Presidency: The Election 2000 Decision and Its Ramifications for the Supreme Court, 61 MD. L. REv.
606, 622-27 (2002).
185. The tendency to defect is especially strong in a one-time or finite iteration game,
because there rarely are ensuing predictable consequences. Conversely, when parties, in-
cluding judges, know that their interactions are ongoing, they are more likely to cooperate
with one another. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 164-66 (1991) (addressing the "hope" of cooperation associated with repeated
.play").
186. See id. Tit-for-tat is a game theory strategy described by cooperation followed by
mirroring the other player's move, cooperation, or defection. See generally JOHN MCMILAN,
GAMES, STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS (1992).
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ification was arrogant, not because of his refusal to recuse himself, but
because he downplayed the obvious appearance of impropriety ac-
companying his decision to make that trip.187
Similarly, the politics of the matter would predict that other Jus-
tices, in this case Justice Ginsburg, may face calls for disqualifications
based on her affiliations. She may likewise consider the possible ef-
fects her affiliations have on the stature of the High Court and the
positive response by all involved to her choice no longer to be associ-
ated with NOW's lecture series. Justice Ginsburg's arrogance in her
speeches also indicates an intolerance of the view of the common man
on these conflicts.1 88
1. Achieving Transparency, if Not Conflict Relief
The singular-Justice method for responding to claims of judicial
conflict of interest is appropriate, if not ideal. Assuming some levels of
good faith, the normal operations of the adversary system, and an ac-
tive and independent press, the chances for exposure of potential
conflicts of interest are high. The inclinations of individual Justices,
the parties to litigation and/or the curious press will tend to insure
transparency, a minimum requirement of any effective conflict of in-
terest policy. Revelation of a potential conflict amounts to disclosure,
calling for an interested public to examine the merits of the respective
claims of conflict and response.
That the Justice's response is dispositive ignores its importance in
vindicating this method of response over other, impracticable or con-
stitutionally questionable alternatives. That formal response is part of
the process hoping to answer whether this Justice can review and de-
cide a case impartially. One need not be convinced by the Justice's
memorandum to understand that it provides vital information about
the Justice's view of claimed conflicts and his manner of dealing with
them. Indeed, there are those who could argue that both Scalia and
Ginsburg did themselves no favors with their responses. The result
may be a longstanding mistrust and impact on their credibility.
Further, such a result has a bobtail effect on the ideological
groups who have embraced them. They have rendered a setback to
those they purported to hold as friends. Ironically, the harm befalls
the principal they were accused of helping through the conflicts.
Those who argue that the Justice is wrong and by his failure to recuse
187. Most would likely interpret "quack, quack" as arrogant. See Von Drehle & Holland,
supra note 1, at 35.
188. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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has unalterably affected the way the public perceives the Court ignore
a judicial history including other claims of bias and conflict of inter-
est. 189 The Court has nonetheless survived and retained its stature as
recognized legal interpreter of last resort.1 90
2. Balancing as a Judicial Norm
One can also defend the current singular-Justice review based on
balancing. Although there is little empirical evidence to support it,
the public must anticipate that its Supreme Court Justices will bring
varying and divisive doctrinal ideologies onto the Court and that, inso-
far as the institutions exist to balance these competing ideologies, es-
pecially via the nomination process, the public will understand and
respect its operation as a primarily legal, but irrefutably somewhat po-
litical, entity. 191 Indeed, balancing appears to be the de facto method
of managing ideological conflicts of interest confronting Supreme
189. For example, Supreme CourtJustices have often maintained close ties with Presi-
dents, including acting as Presidential advisors during their tenures on the Court. Modem
notables among these Justices were William Douglas (advisor to Franklin Roosevelt), Abe
Fortas (Lyndon Johnson), Felix Frankfurter (Franklin Roosevelt), and Fred Vinson (Harry
Truman). See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some
Justices Vote Illegally? 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375 (2003). There is little evidence that these
Justices routinely recused themselves when actions of the administration came before
them. See THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS (Lee
Epstein et al. eds., 1994). Another notable case involves Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and his
close personal and professional relationship with Theodore Roosevelt. Nominated by
Roosevelt and assumed by the President to embrace fully his progressive politics, Holmes
dissented in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), a key case during
Roosevelt's first term, involving the scope of federal antitrust laws championed by the Pres-
ident. Angered by Holmes's dissent, Roosevelt is quoted as saying he "could carve out of a
banana a judge with more backbone." THE SUPREME COURT: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES,
1789-1993, at 289 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
190. The Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), decision on the 2000 presidential election
could undermine the faith and confidence in the Court. Newsweek reported that Justice
O'Connor was concerned about not having a Republican President because she wanted a
Republican to choose her successor and a Democrat's victory meant she would have to
postpone her retirement. Joan Biskupic, Election Still Splits Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2001,
at 1A, see also Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
25, 2000, at 46. There are some on the conservative side of the house who see Justice
O'Connor as unnecessarily concerned inasmuch as she has been the longstanding swing
vote on the Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg triumvirate for the opposite ideology. In effect, so-
called conservatives have been known to utter in response to these stories, "What differ-
ence could it possibly make if a Democrat appoints her successor?" She is known as a
centrist, not a Republican ideologue. Charles Lane, Courting O'Connor: Why the ChiefJustice
Isn't the Chief Justice, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at WIO.
191. Some would take little comfort in this balancing process as the judicial nomina-
tion process for even the federal district court or the federal courts of appeals appears to
be stalled hopelessly in the Senate along ideological grounds. Law professor Peter
Berkowitz outlines the ideological blockades in that process. Peter Berkowitz, The Senate
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Court members. The recusal cases involving Justices Scalia and Gins-
burg bear this out. Absent financial or familial conflicts, and indis-
creet comments about pending cases, the Justices enjoy the freedom,
unavailable to any other federal judge, to make their own call. The
disingenuous conclusion appears to be that it all balances in the end.
However, by contributing to the very politicization of the Court that
some lament, 192 this judicial balancing act involving conflicts of inter-
est must surely take a toll on the Court.
Conclusion
This was not a pretty sight, this Scalia and Ginsburg hoopla. Jus-
tice Scalia may never be the same following the shots he took for duck
hunting with the Vice President. And Justice Ginsburg seemed genu-
inely taken aback by the resulting criticisms of her self-assumed be-
nign affiliations.
That it was not a pretty sight is reassurance that the process
works. There is a means that avoids the evils of bobtailing and the
usurpation of power from the Judicial Branch. That we may have de-
cided the issue of the conflicts of Scalia and Ginsburg differently from
their positions taken is not the issue. That they were forced to air
facts, concerns, views, and justifications and/or rationalizations is. The
public disclosure of the conflict is one means of management. The
attempted balancing of the Court's structure through the political
process is another means of management. The only level of conflicts
management we did not reach in the two situations was removal, i.e.,
recusal. Nevertheless, given our efficacy in the first two management
tools, such action was not necessary because it would compromise
other principles to which we owe a greater duty: accountability of all
under the law (something satisfied by what Justice Scalia described as
humiliating) and the autonomy of the highest court in the land.
Let the Justices' own decisions seal their and the Supreme
Court's fate. When the dust has cleared, we are guessing citizens
would prefer Justices who do measurably less hob-knobbing and affili-
ating than the good Justices Scalia and Ginsburg. Surely they know the
drumming that awaits when their decisions are questionable. How-
ever, even if we can agree with their decisions not to recuse them-
selves, they and other Justices and judges should understand that it is
Judiciary's Opportunity: The Stalemate Can End, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, Apr. 22, 2002, available
at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-berkowitz042202.asp.
192. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 111 (addressing and criticizing the author's failed nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court).
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not their decision that perhaps gives us pause. It is their decision
made without the benefit of public disclosure, something brought
about only when ideological groups and the resulting media force
descended.
Perhaps what most defines the gravity of the conflict is the level of
concealment. If the conflict is as non-existent as the Justices have as-
sured us it is, why the reluctance with regard to disclosure? Practicali-
ties of the Court may require the adoption of self-recusal analysis, but
disclosure of that analysis and result serve to support it as a resolution
for conflicts. Concealment only undermines the unilateral discipline
we are willing to allow.
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